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Description
The Eurozone crisis has pushed reform of the European Union (EU) to the fo-
refront of political debate. How can a Union of 28 states with a population of 
over half a billion be reformed to weather future economic crises and political 
challenges? Finding an answer to this question is extremely difficult not only 
because current reform proposals are so varied, but even more so because we 
lack insights into the preferences for reform amongst national elites and pu-
blics. Although EU support has interested scholars for over three decades now, 
we virtually know nothing about public support for EU reform. Current research 
focuses almost exclusively on the causes of support for the current project and 
fails to provide a sufficient basis for effective reform decisions. Surely, the fea-
sibility and sustainability of EU reform crucially hinges on the support amongst 
national publics. In this report, we examine public support for EU reform by 
developing a theoretical model and employing cutting-edge data collection 
techniques. Our findings will aid policy makers to craft EU reform proposals that 
can secure widespread public support. We aim to meet this objectives by crafting 
a novel multidimensional model, which posits that support for EU reform con-
sists of four dimensions: a functional, communal, utilitarian and institutional 
dimension, and employing novel data collection techniques, such as a conjoint 
experiment.
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Preface
When we look at recent elections in the EU and its member states, we see de-
creasing voter participation and growing support for “EU sceptical” parties. This 
could be interpreted as a sign of mistrust in European governments in gene ral 
or for the EU in particular. In turbulent times, pressing issues like security, em-
ployment and migration make strong collective action and integration neces-
sary. Yet the inability to deliver results to EU citizens leads to doubts about the 
Union. EU member state leaders like Chancellor Merkel, President Hollande, and 
Prime Minister Cameron differ openly about whether there should be more or 
less integration.
A question seldom asked is: Where do European citizens stand when it comes 
to more or less integration?
While academic and political studies about support for European integration 
are abundant, we lack data about what the people think about EU reform. Would 
they prefer a smaller union? One that is less cost effective but cares about social 
inequality and has an elected President at its top? Or do they prefer a larger one 
with a focus on foreign policy? 
The Bertelsmann Stiftung has always been strongly in favour of European 
integration. We believe that we need a functional EU that is politically and eco-
nomically strong. But we also believe in a democratic Union that appeals to its 
citizens. Any EU reform has to take their preferences into consideration if it does 
not wish to share the fate of the constitutional treaty. This study — a conjoint 
experiment embedded in a survey representative in the EU28 — is the first in 
a series. Our EUpinions shed a light on the moods, preferences, and resistance 
of European citizens when it comes to European integration and will aid policy-
makers to craft EU reform proposals that can secure widespread public support. 
Aart De Geus
Chairman and CEO
Bertelsmann Stiftung
Executive Board
Executive Summary
he Eurozone crisis has proven to be a stress test for the European Un-
ion. While recovery may be on its way, the recession has left a mark 
on public opinion. Feelings of discontent and anger over Brussels’ re-
sponse to economic downturn and the influx of refugees seems to have 
caused public support for the European project to plummet to an all-time low. 
This, at least, is the popular perception portrayed in media reports and commen-
tary. But, is it really the case that Euroscepticism has become the norm in 2015? 
This report suggests that caution is in order. Our research demonstrates that 
public support for the EU is ambivalent, and that knowledge about the EU is quite 
high, in fact higher than documented prior to the crisis. Yet to know the Euro-
pean institutions and its politicians does not mean to love them. While a major-
ity of citizens support their country’s membership in the Union and within the 
Eurozone membership in the Euro, they are not satisfied with policy direction in 
the EU. What is more, while a large majority favours further political and eco-
nomic integration, the same respondents say that they espouse negative views 
about the EU when talking to friends. This seems to suggest that they are con-
flicted. Put simply, people support the idea of an united Europe, but are increa-
singly weary about its current direction.
Interestingly, we do not find that the nation state is seen as the alternative, 
quite the contrary. Europe’s citizens may be dissatisfied about the current state 
of affairs in Brussels, but they are equally unhappy with the situation in their 
national capitals. The only clear exception to this pattern is Great Britain. The 
study relies on survey data and an embedded experiment done in July 2015 that 
covers public opinion in the EU28 as well as an in-depth look into opinion in the 
six largest member states. 
What Stands Out About EU Citizens’ European Preferences?
1. Support for membership is high throughout the Union (71 %). It is lowest in 
Great Britain (59 %) where, nevertheless, a majority — in July 2015 — would 
have voted for EU membership in a referendum.
2. A majority of people in the Eurozone support the Euro (63 %), and support 
for the Euro is equally high in southern member states, even though these 
populations were hardest hit by the Eurozone crisis. That said, citizens in 
non-Eurozone countries strongly oppose the Euro (85 %), and support for the 
Euro is lowest in Great Britain (14 %). 
T
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3. On average, people in the EU favour more political and economic integra-
tion in the future (59 %). But this support is slightly higher in countries that 
are part of the Eurozone (64 %). It is especially high in the southern mem-
ber states (71 %). The fact that southern member states are on average more 
supportive of integration is interesting as they have experienced the adverse 
effects of the Eurozone crisis and have had to suffer controversial austerity 
policies as a result.
4. Contrary to findings in the past, citizens in Europe today, and especially 
those in the Eurozone, are much more knowledgeable about the EU. 68 % of 
EU citizens and 74 % of the citizens in the Eurozone display a high knowledge 
about European affairs. Europeans are also more familiar with the leading 
figures in the EU. Even though national leaders receive the highest recogni-
tion rates (Merkel 82 %, Cameron 74 %, Hollande 62 %), their European coun-
terparts score surprisingly high. More Europeans have heard of Jean-Claude 
Juncker and Martin Schulz (both 40 %), Donald Tusk (34 %) and Mario Draghi 
(34 %) than of Matteo Renzi (32 %) or Mariano Rajoy (23 %). Again, Britain is 
the exception with more people having low (52 %) rather than high knowl-
edge (48 %), and with significantly fewer people  familiar with key European 
actors.
5. While support for the European regime (measured by support for member-
ship and within the Eurozone support of the Euro) is high, policy support 
is low. People are on average dissatisfied with the direction that the EU is 
moving (72 %), more so in the South (81 %), especially in Italy (89 %). That 
said, people are equally dissatisfied about the policy direction in their own 
country, less so in Great Britain, Poland and Germany.
6. People see the opening of borders and economic growth as the EU’s biggest 
achievements, while they view peace and security and the fostering of eco-
nomic growth as Europe’s biggest policy needs. 
7. When asked whether they would speak positively or negatively about the EU 
to friends, people on average said they were equally likely to do either (53 % 
positive, 47 % negative). Yet, people in non-Eurozone countries are more op-
timistic. This difference is driven primarily by the strong optimism of the 
citizens in the East. The Danish, British and Swedish are more negative. 
8. Europeans are on average positive about German leadership in the Union 
(55 %), although Germany’s role in the South is evaluated quite negatively 
(60 %). Interestingly, the results suggest that the youngest generation of 
15 to 25-year-olds in the South hold the most positive views about German 
leadership (51 %). 
What Stands Out About Preferences for EU Reform?
1. On average, EU citizens prefer an EU that is not too costly (they don’t mind 
paying up to € 35 per capita a year). They like the EU’s current size. It should 
be designed predominantly to safeguard peace and security as well as pro-
mote economic growth. And they would like to have a say more often through 
referenda.
4
ExEcutivE summaryEUPINIONS  What do thE pEoplE Want?
2. EU citizens as a whole strongly oppose the idea of a directly elected EU Pres-
ident taking decisions, even citizens that clearly  favour more political and 
economic integration. People are on average largely indifferent about nation-
al governments or the European Parliament being the key decision-makers. 
They are only slightly less enthusiastic about the European Commission tak-
ing decisions compared to the European Parliament.
3. Important cross-national differences in EU reform preferences exist. For ex-
ample, the Spaniards and Poles, currently net recipients of the EU budget, are 
willing to pay more for the EU in the future while Britons, French, Germans 
and Italians — all net contributors — are not. Interestingly, the French are 
equally enthusiastic about the prospect of decisions being taken by a direct-
ly elected President rather than the European Parliament, while the British 
clearly prefer national governments being in control or decisions being made 
through referenda. Finally, we find differences based on policy preferences: 
EU citizens in the South and East care significantly about economic growth, 
while citizens of the North  favour a Union dealing primarily with peace and 
security. The latter view the regulation of immigration as of equal impor-
tance to that of growth. 
4. Although we find no differences based on gender, EU reform preferences do 
differ based on age. Generations primarily disagree about who should take 
decisions in the EU and what policy goals the EU should focus on. In France, 
Italy, and Spain, for example, younger generations  favour decision-making 
through referenda rather than the European Parliament, while in Germany 
older generations do. When it comes to policy preferences, we find that both 
the oldest and youngest generations in the EU  favour an EU that safeguards 
peace and security over one that promotes growth. 
5. When it comes to how EU preferences relate to support for EU reform, we 
find no differences based on the level of EU knowledge. Yet, we do find clear 
differences based on overall level of scepticism about the EU. Regardless of 
whether people are sceptical about their country’s membership in the Un-
ion, the Euro, further political and economic integration or the overall policy 
direction, sceptics differ primarily in their views about who ought to take 
decisions in the Union. In contrast to supporters, sceptics are much more 
opposed to a Union in which European actors make policy. The type of EU 
that reform sceptics most want to see is a move towards more national con-
trol, either by means of citizen referenda in which national publics decide or 
through national governments. 
6. Next to more intergovernmental decision-making, sceptics also value an EU 
that regulates immigration more, some even prefer it to one that promotes 
economic growth. 
7. There are, of course, people who are highly supportive of the European Union 
and its politics. They are much less opposed to European institutions taking 
decions decisions for example. 
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What does this mean for the future of the Union and attempts to reform it? 
We maintain that three things are important in this respect. People do support 
the idea of a united Europe, but are increasingly weary about its current execu-
tion. They are largely dissatisfied with many of its current policies, and are keep-
ing a close eye on what is being done. Also, they are much more informed about 
Europe. Finally, people seem to care deeply about who governs them.
The Eurozone crisis has left a mark on public opinion. We find that contrary 
to past findings, citizens in Europe today, and especially those in the Eurozone, 
are much more knowledgeable about the EU. Yet, this higher knowledge does not 
necessarily lead to more approval. This is an important finding for those who 
seek to increase support for European integration merely via better communica-
tion. Our data reveal a much nuanced picture.
While regime support is high, policy support is not. Hence, a more attentive 
citizenry makes it even more important for the EU to perform, not only in terms 
of outcomes but also in terms of its procedures. More than ever, political lead-
ers need to publicly defend what they think is the best way forward in European 
politics. With the political culture of the EU being far from transparent, political 
leaders must find a way to openly argue over policy measures without being per-
ceived as dived, nationalistic and incapable of taking decisions. 
In any representative system, the procedural aspect is particularly important 
as individuals rarely get everything they want in terms of policy outputs and out-
comes. What counts then is the belief that institutions provide a fair articulation 
of one’s interests. One reform that most EU citizens agree on in this context is 
the implementation of referenda. At the same time, they oppose the handover 
of power to a directly elected President. They clearly prefer a diffusion of pow-
er over the concentration of power in Brussels. To implement some element of 
direct democracy in the institutional setting of the EU might be a fruitful way to 
let citizens know that they have some control over “what happens in Brussels”.
Overall, these results convey a message of hope for European officials and 
political actors in the member states. Europeans have not deserted the European 
project. They generally support the EU, the Euro, and even further political and 
economic integration. Following closely what is happening at the European level, 
people today know more than ever before about European politics. 
High level of political knowledge and awareness have consequences. Peo-
ple now pay attention to European politics but they are not satisfied with what 
they see. European political decision-making has clearly given its citizenry an 
inside look into how difficult it is to craft policies to address the looming societal 
challenges in all 28 member states. Thus, while system support is high, policy 
support is not. If elites fail to address discontent over policy outcomes, worries 
about how decisions are made and the good will may fade. If people feel that their 
voices are not heard in Brussels, they may turn against the project altogether. 
Setting aside these concerns may seem tactically beneficial to national govern-
ments in the short term, but the long-term consequences may threaten the very 
existence of the Union.
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The Union Needs Reform, 
But Will the European 
Public Support It?
he Eurozone and refugee crises have pushed reform of the EU to the 
forefront of the political agenda. How can a Union of 28 states with 
a population of over half a billion be reformed to best address future 
crises and challenges? Finding an answer is extremely difficult: not 
only because actual reform proposals range from a full-fledged political union 
to a partial repatriation of powers to nation states, but also because we lack data 
about the support among the national publics for reform. Ever since the ‘no 
votes’ in the 2005 referenda on the Constitutional Treaty, leaders in Brussels and 
national capitals have been faced with a new political reality: the EU is a highly 
divisive topic among national publics (De Vries, 2007; Kriesi, et al., 2008; Hobolt 
2009). Experts are divided, too. Some, such as former Commission economist 
Paul De Grauwe and Nobel laureate Paul Krugman call for the creation of a politi-
cal union that would aid the Euro in withstanding economic shocks and secure 
financial stability in the long run. Yet others, like Council President Donald Tusk, 
warn that the further of pooling sovereignty at the EU level might provoke a se-
rious backlash by national publics and Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs. 
Indeed, the question of what kind of EU reform of the Union is needed and 
feasible is high on the political agenda. On the 7th of October of this year, the 
German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the French President, Francois Hollande, 
gave a joint speech in the European Parliament in Strasburg. They underlined 
that in their opinion the only way for Europe to take on the many challenges it is 
facing is to stand united. Whether it is the Euro crisis, the refugee crisis, the wars 
in Ukraine and Syria or the fight against the global warming. Therefore, they 
argued, further integration will be needed to approve the functioning of those 
parts of the EU that have been particularly tested and displayed their weakness-
es over recent years. Namely the economic and monetary Union, the Schengen 
area, and the external policy of the European Union. Meanwhile the European 
Commission has put forward its vision for a closer economic and monetary Un-
ion with the 5-President report in June 2015 and with a action plan to address the 
refugee crisis later in September. So further reform seems to be inevitable. Yet, 
only if political leaders in Brussels and across European capitals provide a vision 
that can be shared by a majority of Europe’s 500-million-strong population, can 
political and economic reform be sustainable. If EU and national leaders move 
swiftly to further pool policy and institutional competencies without the backing 
of the European EU public, this will most likely backfire. 
The Background
T
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Both pundits and scholars argue that political elites in the past have been so 
eager to pursue integration that they have lost track of the concerns and desires 
of citizens. Elites have also failed to persuade citizens of the wisdom of their 
policies. Instead, many argue, elites have moved ahead with European integra-
tion despite insufficient public support, as became painfully evident in recent 
electoral contests in Brussels and throughout Europe’s national capitals when 
accusations that political elites are out of touch may often be politically moti-
vated, but these charges demonstrate the importance of understanding public 
preferences for reform. What kind of reform do the national publics support? 
While studies about support for European integration are abundant (see 
Hobolt 2012, Hobolt and De Vries 2015 for overviews), today we know virtually 
nothing about EU citizens’ opinion about possible reforms. This is worrisome 
given that a decade ago attempts to reform the Union through the Constitutio-
nal Convention and the Constitutional Treaty failed dramatically to garner sup-
port among national publics. Against this backdrop, it is imperative to provide 
a comprehensive understanding of public support for possible reform of the 
Union. This report presents the findings of a detailed empirical analysis that 
does exactly that. Building on and extending current work on public support for 
European integration, we examined the trade-offs between different aspects of 
integration. Specifically, we focused on four dimensions of support for EU reform:
1. The functional dimension:  
What type of European integration do EU citizens want?
2. The communal dimension:  
With whom do EU citizens want this integration?
3. The utilitarian dimension:  
How much are EU citizens willing to pay for this integration?
4. The institutional dimension:  
How do EU citizens want the European Union to be governed?
These questions capture the key dimensions of support that have been identified 
by experts, and represent some of the most important trade-offs that citizens 
face. Yet, they have not until now been systematically examined in the context 
of possible reform of the Union or in an experimental setting that would allow 
us to capture their causal impact. The functional dimension relates to the pol-
icy that the EU should be promoting. Studies that compare the preferences of 
elites and ordinary citizens for the policy content of integration are relatively 
rare, but those that exist show that while elites favour integration in policy areas 
like trade and finance — citizens would like EU policy-making to concentrate on 
social policy and employment (Hooghe 2003, Müller et al. 2012). The commu-
nal aspect of European integration refers to the political community of the Un-
ion. From existing work we know that the degree to which citizens identify with 
fellow EU citizens from other member states affects the way they evaluate the 
integration process (McLaren 2002, Hooghe and Marks 2005). The utilitarian di-
mension signifies the costs that citizens are willing to pay for closer cooperation 
in Europe and follows from the cost-benefit approach to EU support (Gabel 1998). 
Finally, the institutional dimension relates to the way decisions are taken in the 
EU. Following the work that suggests that the democratic deficit affects peo-
ple’s views of European integration (Rohrschneider 2002), the decision-making 
procedures in the union should be related to support for EU reform. These four 
dimensions are at the core of our data collection.
The background
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Our Method: A Conjoint Experiment Embedded in a Survey
This study provides the first in-depth examination of public support for diverse 
EU reform proposals across member states. Specifically, we utilize a novel data 
collection approach, namely experimental conjoint analysis that originates from 
marketing and psychology research and was recently adapted to fit questions re-
lated to political science. (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014). It maps 
out reform proposals that vary in terms of their functional, communal, utilitar-
ian and institutional characteristics — and that have the most support among 
European citizens. We explore how these characteristics affect public support 
for EU reform by varying the features of each reform proposal. In other words, 
the study provides respondents with different combinations of values of the 
functional, communal, utilitarian and institutional dimensions. Conjoint ex-
periments, which were developed in psychology and marketing, consist of res-
pondents ranking or rating two or more hypothetical choices, in this case reform 
proposals for the EU. These hypothetical choices have multiple attributes, that 
is to say they vary on different dimensions. These dimensions are defined by the 
researcher on the basis of the scholarly literature, and in our case refer to the 
functional, communal, utilitarian and institutional dimensions outlined above. 
The objective of the conjoint experimental design is to estimate the influence of 
each attribute, for example the number of member states in the Union (commu-
nal dimension) or the costs of integration per person per year (utilitarian dimen-
sion), on the choices and ratings of the respondents. In order to make sure that 
alternative explanations are addressed, the political scientist Jens Hainmueller 
and several colleagues (Hainmueller, et al. 2014) have proposed a conjoint meth-
od using fully randomized designs.1
Why is a conjoint experimental design most appropriate for examining pub-
lic support for EU reform? Traditional survey research — upon which our cur-
rent knowledge of support for European integration is based, including our own 
work  — makes it difficult to trace complex and multidimensional preferences. In 
addition, it suffers from well-known causal inference problems. Put differently, 
it is difficult to make any causal claims about the effects of different dimensions 
on choice using the data that is available given that we do not know in which 
direction the causal arrow flows. Finally, do opinions reflect real behaviour? Val-
idation studies have shown that conjoint experiments perform remarkably well 
in predicting real-world behaviour (Hainmueller, et al., 2015). Hence, a conjoint 
experiment helps us maximize the external validity of our findings. When it 
comes to multidimensional preferences, a fully randomized conjoint in which 
survey respondents compare different sets of two possible proposals for EU re-
form and choose between them, allows us to assess the influence of different 
features of the proposed reform on how respondents evaluate a given proposal 
relative to another. One of the advantages of using a fully randomized design —  
that is randomizing the exact values on the different dimensions that feature on 
a reform proposal — is that the causal effect of the features of reform proposals 
on public support are non-parametrically identified. This means that one does 
not need to rely on assumptions about the functional form that maps reform 
proposal features on support (see Hainmueller, et al., 2014). The randomization 
1 This approach was corroborated in recent work on support for global climate agreements by Bechtel and 
Scheve (2013) published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences and work on support for EU 
bailouts in Germany by Bechtel, et al. (2014) published in the American Journal of Political Science.
The background
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also ensures that the treatment groups are comparable with observable and un-
observable confounding factors, that is to say with respect to alternative expla-
nations. For example, respondents might interpret some of the information pro-
vided differently, which could affect the extent to which their support for an EU 
reform proposal depends on its speciﬁc design features. However, because of the 
randomization applied to a large sample any potentially confounding variables 
will be distributed uniformly across treatment groups. Therefore, these groups 
will remain comparable, which means the estimates of how different reform fea-
tures affect public support for EU integration remain valid even in the presence 
of differences in respondents’ subjective interpretations and beliefs. 
Table 1: Conjoint Experimental Conditions
Dimension FeaTures ProPosal 1 ProPosal 2
Functional Policy
The primary policy 
the EU should be 
promoting
This displays which policy the EU promotes in 
the different proposals
Communal Membership
Number of EU  
member states
This displays the number of states of the EU 
in the different proposals
Utilitarian Costs 
Costs of EU  
membership per 
person per year
This displays the annual contribution of EU 
membership in the different proposals
Institutional Decision Making
Actors responsible 
for EU decision 
making
This displays who decides on policies in the 
EU in the different proposals
Which reform proposal do you prefer? O O
Table 1 provides an overview of the conjoint experimental design that was used. 
In the survey, respondents were shown two hypothetical EU reform proposals in 
comparison and asked to choose between them. Each respondent was randomly 
assigned four of these binary comparisons of EU reform proposals. Respondents 
were presented with a paragraph briefly explaining the task they are about to 
complete. 
Subsequently, respondents were presented with four binary comparisons of 
different reform proposals. For each of the four binary comparisons respondents 
were shown a table (see Table 1) displaying two reform proposals. The order in 
which the features of the different dimensions were displayed to respondents 
was randomized, which circumvents the possibility that the ordering by which 
respondents receive the information affects the likelihood of them supporting 
particular reform proposals over others. After each table, respondents were 
asked which proposal they prefer. In addition, asked to rate each proposal by 
answering how likely it is that they would vote for either proposal in a referen-
dum, ranging from not very likely to very likely. Overall, each binary comparison 
The background
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was comprised of two questions: a choice for one proposal and a rating of each 
proposal, and each respondent faced four binary comparisons.2
Table 2: Dimensions, Features and Values for EU Reform Conjoint Experiment
Dimension FeaTures Values
Functional Policy
The primary policy 
the EU should be 
promoting
Social inequality
Peace and security
Economic growth  
 Energy Safety 
 Immigration 
 Climate Change
Communal Membership
Number of EU  
member states
6 countries
15 countries
28 countries
35 countries
40 countries
Utilitarian Costs 
Costs of EU  
membership per 
person per year
€ 211 
€ 107
€ 63
€ 35
€ 0
Institutional Decision Making
Actors responsible 
for EU decision 
making
European Parliament
National Governments 
Elected European President 
European Commission
Citizens through referenda
Table 2 shows the dimensions, features, and values used in the conjoint experi-
ment. For each reform proposal presented to the respondent, the values for each 
dimension were assigned randomly. The choice of policy areas draws predom-
inantly on the work by Müller et al. (2012). As the primary policies that the EU 
should promote we added classical ‘European’ ones like peace and security as 
well as economic growth, but also inequality reduction and immigration, which 
have become salient in current debates on the context of the refugee crisis in the 
Mediterranean and the Eurozone crisis. In order to operationalize the communal 
aspect of European integration, the number of member states in the Union was 
included. This reflects debates about and studies of future enlargements and the 
EU bailouts that suggest that regional divides are pertinent (Dixon and Fullerton 
2014, Bechtel, et al. 2014). To explore the degree to which people are willing to sac-
rifice income for further integration, the annual net contribution per person per 
year is added (Anderson and Reichert 1995, Gabel 1998). The cost values are based 
on the 2009/2011 net contributions to the EU budget ranging from highest in 
Denmark (€ 211 per person per year) to lowest in Lithuania (€ 0 per person per year) 
2 Johnson and Orme (1996) suggest that in choice-based conjoint modelling one can reduce measurement error 
by increasing the number of tasks that each respondent completes. In addition, allowing respondents to com-
plete more than one task is desirable as it increases the accuracy of responses through facilitating the under-
standing of the task involved. Yet, too many choice tasks may become too demanding or even lead to boredom. 
Following recent work by Bechtel and Scheve (2013), four choice tasks were included which allowed for some 
learning while not overburdening respondents.
The background
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which were publicly available. Finally, based on the discussion about the demo-
cratic deficit and governance in the EU (Scharpf 1999, Rohrschneider 2002, 
Føllesdal and Hix 2006), a feature that inquires into who decides on policy in the 
EU, is added. This relates to the type of policy-making in the EU and ranges from 
technocratic governance (decision-making by the European Commission) to di-
rect democracy (decision-making through popular referenda). 
Next to the conjoint survey experiment, we also fielded a questionnaire in-
quiring into attitudes and knowledge of the EU and their national systems. This 
allowed us to capture the general mood of respondents, put it in a national per-
spective, and determine how support for different reform proposals might also 
vary across different respondents. The public opinion data collection was carried 
out by Dalia Research GmbH using mobile phone applications.3 The fieldwork 
was conducted in July 2015 based on a representative sample of citizens from 
all 28 member states as well as representative samples from the six EU member 
states with the largest populations: France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and 
the UK. 
Our Findings: What Type of Union Do People Want?
Short Summary
The presentation of the results is divided in two parts. Part I presents an over-
view of the overall ‘European mood’ of the European citizenry in different re-
gions and in the six largest member states in July 2015. It aims to place this in the 
context of people’s views about their national systems. The findings show that:
 » Contrary to growing media reports and common opinion, Europe’s citizens 
can by no means be classified as Euroceptics, but rather have ambivalent at-
titudes towards Europe (see also De Vries and Steenbergen 2013). 
 » While a majority of people, even in the bailout-battered South, support their 
country’s membership in the Union and in the Eurozone, they are not satis-
fied with the EU’s current policy direction. 
 » Moreover, we find that while a large majority  favours further political and 
economic integration in Europe, at the same time Europeans would be equally 
likely to express negative views about the EU than positive ones when talking 
to friends. This seems to suggest that while people support the idea of a uni-
ted Europe, they are increasingly weary about its current governance. 
 » The only part of the Union that is perhaps best classified as Eurosceptic is 
Great Britain.
 » Finally, our results indicate that even if Europe’s citizens are dissatisfied 
with the current state of affairs in Brussels, they are equally unhappy with 
the situation in their national capitals. 
 
Part II presents an overview of the findings based on our conjoint experiment. 
Against the backdrop of our main finding — that a majority of the European 
3  For further information see https://daliaresearch.com/.
The background
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citizenry supports membership and further integration, yet is dissatisfied about 
the current state of affairs — it is pertinent to explore what kind of Union people 
would support in the future. We explored how costs, different decision-making 
institutions, the number of member states, and the policy goals pursued affect 
support for EU reform proposals. 
We find that:
 » Two changes to the current status quo are particularly popular among EU cit-
izens: The use of referenda as a means of decision-making in the EU, and a 
Union that focuses on peace and security issues. In addition, people are in-
different about raising the average contribution to € 35 in the EU compared to 
the current level of € 0 per capita, but would not like to pay much more than 
that. They are strongly opposed to the notion of an elected European Presi-
dent taking decisions. Of all of the European actors, they prefer the European 
Parliament taking decisions. In terms of size, they  favour the status quo of 
28 member states. Finally, next to security and peace, people prefer an EU 
promoting economic growth rather than other policy goals such as securing 
energy safety, combatting climate change or regulating immigration. 
 » Yet, key regional and individual level differences exist. They relate mainly 
to people’s views about who ought to make decisions in the Union and what 
should be the EU’s core policies. For example, in the case of how decisions 
are made in the EU, the French are largely indifferent about EU decision- 
making via a directly elected President or the European Parliament, most 
likely because they have a President at home. Yet the British and overall 
more Eurosceptic citizens in other member states prefer a Union in which 
decision-making takes place via national governments or referenda, not 
through European institutions like the European Parliament or Commission. 
 » Finally, we find that EU reform preferences differ based on age. Generations 
primarily disagree about who should take decisions in the EU and what policy 
goals the EU should focus on. In France, Italy and Spain, for example, younger 
generations  favour decision-making via referenda rather than the European 
Parliament, while in Germany it is older generations that do. When it comes 
to policy preferences, we find that both the oldest and youngest gene rations 
favour an EU that safeguards peace and security over one that promotes growth. 
The background
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What Is the Mood in 
Europe About Europe?
et us first explore whether European citizens have a modicum of 
knowledge about the EU that would then allow us to delve deeper into 
their attitudes towards different aspects of the EU, such as EU mem-
bership, the Euro and preference for further political and economic 
integration. It is well established that voters differ with regard to their cognitive 
capacities and knowledge about politics (Converse 1964, Zaller 1992, Delli Carpini 
and Keeter 1996). In the literature on public support for European integration, a 
debate exists about citizens’ ability to form “real” opinions about the European 
integration process. It has been traditionally argued that European integration 
is one of the most complex political issues that European publics face, and that 
much of the day-to-day debate involves highly technical questions that citizens 
may find difficult to grasp (see for example Anderson 1998). The EU for much of 
its history was presented to citizens as a matter of foreign policy, about which 
citizens tended to have little knowledge (Holsti 1992, Karp, Banducci and Bowler 
2003, De Vries et al. 2011). This was long supported by survey evidence. For 
example, results from the European Election Study in 1999 suggest that more 
than three-quarters of European citizens did not feel sufficiently informed 
about the politics of the EU. Yet, by 2014 the survey found that over 65 percent 
of European citizens were able to correctly answer at least one of two “EU know l - 
edge questions” concerning membership of Switzerland in the Union and a 
procedural aspect of European Parliament elections. Our survey results under-
score this finding, and suggest that by 2015 people have in fact become quite 
Part I
l
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knowledgeable about the EU and know some of the key EU officials like Commis-
sion President Juncker, for example.
Figure 1 displays the percentage of people who were able to correctly answer 
at least one of two factual knowledge questions about the EU. The first ques-
tion asks whether Switzerland was a member of the EU, and the second question 
asks whether all member states have the same number of parliamentarians in 
the European Parliament. A clear majority — 68 percent of people — answered 
at least one of these questions correctly. This is considerable and suggests that 
knowledge about EU affairs by 2015 is quite high. This slightly higher level of 
knowledge than reported in the European Election Surveys of the late 1990s or 
early 2000s is perhaps a by-product of the Eurozone crisis that has brought EU 
affairs to the forefront of political debate and media coverage. 
To explore whether the Eurozone 
crisis indeed increased the salience 
of EU affairs in the minds of ordinary 
people and made them pay closer at-
tention and become informed, we ex-
plore differences between the Euro-
zone and non-Eurozone countries. If 
the Eurozone crisis at least partial-
ly contributed to information being 
more readily available, we ought to 
find that knowledge about the EU is 
higher in countries that are part of 
the Eurozone and thus more affec ted 
by the crisis compared to non-Eu-
rozone countries. Figure 2 below 
suggests that this is the case: When 
evaluated by answering at least one of 
the two factual knowledge questions 
correctly, 74 percent of citizens in the 
Eurozone did so compared to just 56 
percent in non-Eurozone countries. 
The inspection of regional differences 
in Figure 3 confirms this further. In 
the North non-Eurozone region, in-
cluding Denmark, Great Britain and 
Sweden, we find an equal amount of 
people who have low compared to 
high levels of knowledge. In the East, 
where the Baltic states, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia have joined the Euro, but 
other countries like Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for exam-
ple have not, the gap between high and low EU knowledge is narrower, than in 
the North Eurozone or the South. This seems to indicate that knowledge about 
the EU is higher in regions that have the Euro and thus were most affected by the 
crisis, either as creditors or debtors.
 
FIGURE 1   Knowledge About the EU is high
Knowledge about EU?
68%
High 
32%
Low 
FIGURE 2   Knowledge About the EU is higher 
in Eurozone Countries
Eurozone
Non-Eurozone
68%
74% 26%
32%
High LowKnowledge About EU?
FIGURE 3   Knowledge About the EU is lowest 
in North non-Eurozone Region
North Eurozone
South 
North non-Eurozone
East 
68%
73%
50%
77%
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50%
Knowledge About EU?
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Figure 4 below plots the propor tion 
of people with high and low knowl-
edge about the EU in the six largest 
member states. Again, knowledge 
is highest in countries that have 
adopted the Euro: France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain; and lower in the 
non-Eurozone countries: Great Britain 
and Poland. Interestingly, in one 
country, Great Britain, the proportion 
of people displaying low knowledge 
about the EU with 52 percent actual-
ly exceeds that of high knowledge (48 
percent), although this gap is small. 
This low level of knowledge about the 
EU means that politicians and journa-
lists may have significant room for ex-
plaining and molding public opinion 
in the upcoming Brexit referendum. 
Our finding that knowledge about the EU is fairly high, yet not equally 
distributed across the Union, is further confirmed when we inspect the name 
recogni tion of key EU officials and compare those to national heads of state. Pro-
viding this national yardstick is important and it puts our findings in a compara-
tive context. Perhaps people by 2015 are indeed quite informed about the EU, but 
still much less so compared to their national systems. We explore this possibility 
by focusing on two questions in our survey where we ask respondents whether 
they have heard of the following sets of names: 
1. Angela Merkel, François Hollande, David Cameron, Barack Obama, Ewa 
Kopacz, Mariano Rajoy, Matteo Renzi, Alexis Tsipras.
2. Martin Schulz, Jean-Claude Juncker, Mario Draghi, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, 
Donald Tusk. 
 
Figures 5A and 5B provide an overview of the name recognition of nation-
al heads of state and EU officials across all 28 member states. Not surprisingly, 
nearly all people recognize the names of the US President Barack Obama and 
German Chancellor Merkel, and a considerable amount of people have heard of 
the British Prime Minister David Cameron and the French President François 
Hollande. The national heads of state of Southern and East European countries, 
specifically Spain, Italy, Greece, and Poland, are far less known — with the ex-
ception of Greece’s Alexis Tsipras. Given that in the time frame of investiga-
tion, July 2015, the Greek bailout talks were in full force, the name recognition of 
Tsipras should not come as a surprise. Yet, it is perhaps surprising to see that a 
considerable share of people know the European Parliament President Martin 
Schulz, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, the ECB President Mario 
Draghi and the Council President Donald Tusk. In fact, more people know these 
top EU officials than the current Spanish or Italian Prime Minister or Polish Pres-
ident. This seems to confirm our previous findings that by July 2015 knowledge 
about the EU and its officials is in fact quite high. 
High LowKnowledge About EU?
Germany
France
Poland
Spain
76%
57%
79% 21%
24%
34%
43%
Great Britain
48% 52%
Italy
80% 20%
66%
FIGURE 4    The Share of People with 
Low Knowledge About the EU is Greatest 
in Great Britain
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Do we again find that knowledge about the EU is higher in the Eurozone com-
pared to the non-Eurozone? Figures 6A and 6B present the same information 
about name recognition of national and European leaders as presented above, 
but they seperate the results for countries within and outside the Eurozone. For 
name recognition of national leaders Obama and Merkel, we find little difference 
between the Eurozone and non-Eurozone member states. But for EU officials we 
find more variation. Except for Council President Tusk, people in the Eurozone 
FIGURE 5A   Most People Know President Obama and Chancellor Merkel
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74%
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FIGURE 5B   More People Know Top EU Officials than Prime Minister Renzi or Rajoy
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FIGURE 6A   Most People Know President Obama and Chancellor Merkel
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are more likely to recoginize the names of top EU officials compared to those out-
side. Interestingly, this holds especially true for Draghi and Dijsselbloem. While 
in the Eurozone 44 and 20 percent of people recognize their names, these shares 
are much lower in the non-Eurozone, namely 13 and 6 percent respectively. 
When we compare the name recognition of top EU officials across regions, strik-
ing differences emerge that suggest that the Eurozone crisis starkly increased 
knowledge about EU affairs. Name recognition is by far the lowest in the North 
non-Eurozone member states followed by the East. Do note that most people 
in the East have heard of Council President Donald Tusk. Given that he was the 
President of Poland, this might not be entirely surprising. Interesting is also the 
fact that name recoginition of Mario Draghi is enormous in the South: 69 per-
cent have heard of the ECB President. In fact, as many southerners have heard 
of Draghi as have of French President Hollande. In the North non-Eurozone and 
East name recognition of Draghi is lowest . 
Finally, Figure 7 shows the share of people that have heard of top EU offi-
cials in Great Britain (the figures for the five other largest member states 
can be found in the Appendix). British citizens not only hold the lowest 
level of factual knowledge about the EU, they are also least aware of who its top 
FIGURE 6B   Many Differences in Name Recognition of Draghi and Dijsselbloem 
between Eurozone and non-Eurozone
Does This Name Sound Familiar? Figures in percent
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FIGURE 7   Name Recognition of EU Officials
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officials are. Less than a third of British citizens have heard of the leaders of 
Europe’s legislative and executive institutions, Commission President Juncker, 
European Parliament President Schulz and Council President Tusk. Even fewer 
British citizens have heard of ECB President Draghi or the chair of the Eurogroup 
Dijsselbloem, 9 and 4 percent respectively. Given that Great Britain is not part of 
the Eurozone, less knowledge about the latter two might not be surprising, yet 
the low levels of name recognition of other EU leaders underline our previous 
result that knowledge about EU affairs is very low among British citizens. 
Membership and Euro Support
After we have established that on average people are quite knowledgeable about 
the EU, we delve deeper into their EU preferences. When examining support for 
political systems, political scientists often make a distinction between two dif-
ferent modes of political support: diffuse and specific (Easton 1965). Whereas 
diffuse support refers to the evaluation of the regime, broadly defined as the 
system of government and the constitutional arrangements underlying it, spe-
cific support relates more to policy, that is the binding collective decisions and 
actions taken by political actors operating in the broader system of government 
(see Norris 1999). Therefore in the context of European integration, scholars 
have distinguished between regime support and policy support (Hobolt and De 
Vries 2015). Regime support signifies support for the constitutional settlement of 
the EU, as laid down in the various treaties, including support for membership of 
this union. Policy support refers to support for the content of collective decisions 
and actions taken by EU actors.
Regime support is crucial to any system since it allows systems to retain 
legitimacy even when people become disillusioned with the performance of 
specific governments and policies (see Norris 1999). In established democra-
cies, regime support is often taken for granted; yet in the context of the EU it is 
still fragile. Unlike most established nation states, the EU is characterized by a 
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hybrid multi-level political system (Hooghe and Marks 2001). Moreover, there 
exists uncertainty about the scope of its competences, its demos, and its external 
boundaries. Moreover, the aims of the Union are contested by politicians and 
publics in many member states. This presents a considerable challenge to the 
European project (Mair 2007, De Wilde and Trenz 2012). Yet, at the same time, 
the far-reaching economic and political integration in Europe means that the EU 
is increasingly dependent on public support as it lacks long-lasting loyalty to its 
goals and institutions like that found at the national level. Since the actions of all 
elites will occasionally fail to meet public expectations, i.e. policy support in the 
EU will be variable, the Union needs a buffer against short-term policy failures 
through some degree of regime support (Scharpf 1999). Consequently, an exam-
ination of regime support in the EU is of vital importance. 
Figure 8 below provides an over-
view of the proportion of people that 
support their country’s membership 
in the Union. Specifically, we asked 
respondents the following question: 
“Imagine there is a referendum and you 
could decide whether your country stays 
as a member of the European Union. How 
would you vote? 1) I would vote for my 
country to leave the European Union, 2) I 
would vote for my country to stay in the 
European Union.” The findings in Fig-
ure 8 suggest that on average broad-
based support for EU membership ex-
ists throughout the 28 member states. 
Almost three-quarters of those sur-
veyed (71 percent) would vote for their 
country to remain a member of the 
Union if a referendum about member-
ship were held today. 
Interestingly, support for mem-
bership does not vary much inside 
and outside the Eurozone. Figure 9 
below shows that while support for 
membership in the Eurozone is at 72 
percent, outside the Eurozone 69 per-
cent of people would vote for their 
country to stay in the Union. Yet, we 
do find that support for membership 
is at its lowest level in the North Euro-
zone region (Denmark, Great Britain, 
Sweden). Although 62 percent of peo-
ple in those countries would vote for their country to remain a member of the 
Union, 38 percent would vote against it, which is roughly 10 percent more than 
in the other regions. 
FIGURE 8   Membership Support is High
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FIGURE 9   Support for Membership is Equally
High in Eurozone vs non-Eurozone Countries
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FIGURE 10  Support for Membership is Lowest
in North non-Eurozone Region
North Eurozone
North non-Eurozone
East
South
71%
62%
76%
72% 28%
38%
29%
24%
Vote in Membership
Referendum? To ExitTo Stay In
20
PART I:  WHAT IS THE MOOD IN EUROPE ABOUT EUROPE?EUPINIONS  WHAT DO THE PEOPlE WANT?
If we inspect support for membership in the Union in the six largest member 
states, see Figure 11, we find that overall support for membership consists of well 
over two-thirds of the population in France, Germany, Poland and Spain, but is 
considerably lower in Great Britain and Italy. In these countries, the majority of 
the population would vote for their country to remain a member, but 41 and 38 
percent respectively say that they would support an exit. The British findings are 
of course especially interesting given the prospect of a membership referendum 
in 2016 or 2017. Our findings confirm those of British polls conducted by YouGov 
and MORI that suggest that at the present time a small majority of Britons would 
favour membership over exit. 
Overall, these findings suggest 
that regime support as measured 
through membership preferences re-
mains high even given the recent tur-
bulence caused by the Eurozone crisis. 
But what about support for the Euro? 
Is it more fragile? It is important to 
remember that support for the Euro 
can be perceived as a form of regime 
support only in the Eurozone as these 
countries have opted for the common 
currency as a sign of the European 
project. For non-Eurozone members 
support for the Euro might rather 
constitute a form of policy support 
and therefore could be more fickle. 
Figures 12A and 12B show the distri-
bution of answers to the following 
question: “Ok, now imagine there is referendum on the Euro as a currency. Do you want 
your country to have the Euro as a currency? 1) Yes, I would vote for the Euro as a currency, 
2) No, I would vote against the Euro as a currency” for the EU28 and Eurozone versus 
non-Eurozone members respectively. 
While Figure 12A indicates that in 
the EU as a whole the share of people 
who would vote for the Euro in a ref-
erendum is about the same size as the 
one voting against the Euro, the find-
ings presented in Figure 12B show that 
this figure, however, masks great var-
iation between Eurozone and non-Eu-
rozone members. While in the Euro-
zone countries a majority would vote 
to keep the Euro as their currency, in 
the non-Eurozone countries a clear 
majority of 74 percent would vote 
against introducing the Euro. If we 
delve even further into possible re-
gional differences in Euro support (see 
Figure 13), we find that the opposition 
to the Euro is the greatest in Denmark, 
Germany
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41%
38%
19%
Spain
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FIGURE 11   Support for Membership Lowest
in Great Britain and Italy
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Great Britain and Sweden, i.e. the 
North Non-Eurozone, followed by the 
East. Moreover, it is interesting to 
note that the support for the Euro in 
the South that was adversely affected 
by the Eurozone crisis is equal to sup-
port among the creditor countries in 
the North Eurozone. 
Finally, Figure 14 presents the 
average support for the Euro in the 
six largest member states in terms 
of population size. As expected, sup-
port for the Euro is lowest in Great 
Britain, only 14 percent of British 
citizens would vote for the Euro in a 
referendum; quite unexpectedly perhaps, it is the highest in Spain, a country 
that was hit hard in the Eurozone crisis and has experienced austerity measures 
since then. Yet, both support for membership and the Euro remain extremely 
high in Spain. Support for the Euro reaches the 60 percent mark in both France 
and Germany, yet compared to support for membership the Euro seems more 
contested in these countries. In Italy 
we find that there is only a slight ma-
jority that supports the Euro, namely 
56 percent. This mirrors the slightly 
weaker support for membership com-
pared to France, Germany, Poland and 
Spain found in Figure 11. 
On the whole, these findings sug-
gest that regime support as measured 
through membership preferences and 
Euro preferences in the Eurozone is 
considerable. Italy shows the lowest 
support although a majority of Ital-
ians support their country’s mem-
bership in the Union and the Euro. In 
the non-Eurozone support for mem-
bership, with the slight exception of 
Great Britain, is high while support 
for the introduction of the Euro is low. 
Given the problems surrounding the 
Eurozone crisis and the Greek bailouts, this may not come as a surprise. Overall, 
regime support in the Union is substantial. This is important for the EU in order 
for it to weather past and current policy challenges, such as those concerning the 
Euro and the large influx of refugees from Africa and the Middle East. 
FIGURE 13  Opposition to Euro Greatest in
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Support for Further Political and Economic Integration in Europe
Average support for further political and economic integration in Europe is also 
high among the European citizenry. In our survey we solicited integration pref-
erences using the following question: 
“If you had to choose, which of the following statements best describes your overall atti-
tude towards European integration?
1. We need more political and economic 
integration across Europe
2. Things should remain as they are 
today
3. We need less political and economic 
integration across Europe.”
Figure 15 below shows the distri-
bu tion of responses for our represen ta-
tive sample of all 28 EU member states.
The findings show that 59 percent 
of people prefer more political and 
economic integration in Europe, while 
only 24 percent prefer less and 16 per-
cent wish the status quo to remain as 
it is. This suggests that not only do a 
majority of people prefer their coun-
try to remain in the EU, they also wish 
to see further integration in the fu-
ture. Yet, this picture might change when we consider regional and country dif-
ferences as displayed in Figures 16 through 18. Indeed, it does. Figure 16 shows 
that support for more political and economic integration is, with 64 percent, 
14 percent higher in Eurozone countries compared to non-Eurozone countries. 
FIGURE 15   Within the EU-28 People Prefer 
More Political and Economic Integration
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The findings presented in Figure 17 
suggest that while support for further 
integration is far more pronounced in 
the Southern region, namely 71 per-
cent of people  favour more political 
and economic integration, it is the 
lowest in the North non-Eurozone re-
gion, where only 41 percent do. Sup-
port for further integration in the East 
and North Eurozone is almost iden-
tical with a slight majority, 58 and 53 
percent respectively,  favouring more 
integration. 
Finally, Figure 18 indicates that 
only in Great Britain do we find an 
equal share of people  favouring more 
versus less integration (both 39 per-
cent). More than three-quarters of 
Italians and Spaniards  favour more 
integration. In Germany, France and 
Poland also a slight majority of peo-
ple do: 56 percent. Put together, these 
findings indicate that on average peo-
ple in the Union  favour more political 
and economic integration in the fu-
ture, but that this support is slightly 
higher in countries that are part of the 
Eurozone and especially in southern 
member states. The fact that southern 
member states are on average more 
supportive of integration is interest-
ing as they have experienced adverse 
effects of the Eurozone crisis and had 
to implement controversial austerity 
packages as a result. Like in the case of membership and the Euro, support for 
further integration is at its lowest level in Great Britain where only slightly more 
than a one-third of people  favour more integration. 
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The Biggest Policy Achievements and Policy Needs in Europe
So far, we have reviewed people’s regime preferences and paid little attention to 
support for policies. Even though we found that people are quite knowledgeable 
about the EU, we cannot realistically expect them to have clear opinions about 
detailed policy proposals or outcomes. Rather we ask respondents about their 
views on the EU’s biggest policy achievements to date and the policy areas that 
need more attention. In order to facilitate responses, we provided them with a 
list of options:
Biggest policy achievements: 
1. Opening borders across Europe
2. Establishing a common currency
3. Creating a common agriculture policy
4. Facilitating trade across Europe
5. Securing peace and cooperation
6. Supporting reform in Eastern Europe
7. Fighting climate change
8. Protecting consumers’ rights
9. Creating jobs
10. Protecting human and social rights
Policy Areas Needing More Attention: 
1. Harmonizing taxes across Europe
2. Securing borders
3. Reforming immigration policies
4. Helping poor countries
5. Strengthening consumer protection laws
6. Fighting climate change
7. Supporting economic growth
8. Investing in infrastructure
9. Reducing inequality
10. Secure peace and security
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Figures 19A and 19B present an overview of responses to both sets of ques-
tions. Within the EU28 people feel that both the opening of borders and the 
facilitation of intra-EU trade are Europe’s biggest achievements (46 and 45 per-
cent each), followed by secu ring peace and coope ration (40 percent) and estab-
lishing the common currency, crea ting jobs and protecting human and social 
rights (37 percent). By far the most important policy priorities in the eyes of EU 
citizens are securing peace and security (61 percent) and suppor ting economic 
growth (54) in Europe.
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FIGURE 19B   Security and Growth Are Seen As Europe’s Most Pressing Policy Needs in EU-28
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FIGURE 19A   Opening Borders and Intra-EU Trade Are Seen as Europe’s Biggest Achievements in EU-28
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Next to these policy priorities, people also view the reduction of social inequality 
(47 percent) and the reform of immigration policies (42 percent) of key impor-
tance. Figures 20A and 20B show the distribution of perceptions of the EU’s big-
gest achievements and most pressing policy priorities for the Eurozone member 
and non-Eurozone member respectively. In terms of policy priorities we find 
little differences between people who reside in the Eurozone versus those that 
reside outside. Differences regarding the perceptions about the EU’s biggest 
achievement differences are also small, but we do find that while the opening 
of borders is perceived as Europe’s biggest achievement in the non-Eurozone, 
more intra-EU trade is within the Eurozone countries.
Finally, when we inspect regio nal differences in Figures 21A through 
21B, we also find less disagreement about people’s views about which the 
most pressing policy priorities should be compared to people’s percep-
tion of the EU’s biggest achievements. Across the North, South and East, 
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FIGURE 20A  Opening Borders Europe’s Biggest Achievements in non-Eurozone, While Trade in Eurozone
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FIGURE 20B  Not Many Differences in EU‘s Pressing Policy Priorities in Eurozone versus non-Eurozone Members
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people view peace and security as well as economic growth as the Union’s 
top priorities. When it comes to Europe’s biggest achievements in the North 
Eurozone, the opening of borders and the facilitation of intra-EU trade as well 
as creating jobs was high on people’s lists, while in the North non-Eurozone 
human rights was considered a key achievement of the EU, much more so than 
opening borders. People in the South mentioned creating jobs, and peace and 
human rights, while in the East we find a pattern similar to the North Eurozone: 
people mention opening borders and trade first when thinking about the EU’s 
biggest achievements. 
Overall, peace and security feature as the most important policy priorities in the 
EU, while the facili tation of trade and the opening of borders were mentioned 
frequently as Europe’s biggest achievements. Yet, considerable regional varia-
tion exists (results for the six largest countries can be found in the appendix).
Opening
Borders
Trade Peace Creating
Jobs
Human
Rights
Common
Currency
Consumer
Rights
Environmental
Protection
Common
Agriculture Policy
FIGURE 21A   EU’s Biggest Achievements
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FIGURE 21B   EU’s Most Pressing Policy Priorities
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Views about the Direction the EU and the Country are Moving
So far, we have established EU citizens’ regime and policy preferences without 
any reference to the national level. Now we delve deeper into popular evaluations 
of policy by comparing their opinions about the policy direction in which they 
view the EU and their country moving. Recall that we suggested that research 
suggests that knowledge of specific outcomes is sketchy at best (Zaller 1992, 
Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). By consequence then, political scientists often 
rely on general evaluations of the state of the country and /or the economy (see 
Kinder and Kiewit 1984, Anderson and Guillory 1997 for example). Following 
these insights, we tap into policy preferences by comparing and contracting 
questions about people’s evaluations 
about the policy direction in which 
their country or the EU is moving. Fi-
gure 22 below provides the compa-
rison between the shares of people 
stating that the EU is moving in the 
right versus the wrong direction policy- 
wise, and those same shares when 
people are asked to evaluate the policy 
direction in their country. The results 
indicate that in the EU28 people view 
policies in the EU moving in the wrong 
direction (72 percent), but that they 
are equally sceptical about policies in 
their own countries (68 percent). 
Interestingly, if we split these results for Eurozone versus non-Eurozone 
countries (Figure 23), we find that within the Eurozone people are on average 
more sceptical about the EU or their country’s policy direction compared to those 
outside the Eurozone. People within the Eurozone are 14 and 11 percent more 
sceptical about the policy direction of the EU and their country respectively com-
pared to those outside. 
Moving in the Right Direction?
72%
Wrong EU
28%
Right EU
FIGURE 22   Within the EU-28 People View 
that Both the EU and Their Country Are 
Moving in the Wrong Direction
68%
Wrong 
National
32%
Right 
National
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In terms of regional differences as 
presented in Figure 24, we find that 
people in the South are most sceptical 
about the direction in which things 
are moving in the EU and in their res-
pective countries, while people in the 
East are the least sceptical about the 
policy direction in the EU and less 
so than about the policy direction 
of their country. With the exeption 
of the East, people are slightly more 
sceptical about the policy direction of 
the EU compared to their own coun-
try, although in the South these diffe-
rences are almost negligible. 
If we delve a bit further into the 
variation across countries by fo-
cusing on differences within the 
six largest member states (Figure 
25), we find that Italians are most 
sceptical about both the policy di-
rection in the EU and their country, 
while Poles are least sceptical. In 
most countries, except for Germany 
and Great Britain, people are equally 
sceptical about policy direction in the 
EU compared to their own country. 
Only in Germany and Great Britain do 
we find that the difference between 
both evaluations is statically signifi-
cant (p <.05). Germans are on average 
9 percent and British 12 percent more 
sceptical about the policy direction in 
which the EU is moving compared to 
their country, albeit that the majority 
of them is on average more sceptical 
than optimistic about the policy di-
rection in their country.
Non-Eurozone
63%
Moving in Right Direction?
FIGURE 23  People More Sceptical About EU
and National Policy Direction in Eurozone
Countries
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FIGURE 24  In the South People Are Most
Sceptical about Policy Direction in the EU
and their Own Country
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FIGURE 25  In the South People Are Most
Sceptical about Policy Direction in the EU
and their Own Country
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These findings suggest that while we previously found that regime support is 
quite high in the EU, policy support is not. The majority of people in the 28 mem-
ber states are weary of the EU’s policy direction. Yet, at the same time, they are 
also sceptical about the policy direction of their own country. People in the South, 
and especially Italians, are deeply sceptical about the direction things are moving 
in their country and the EU, while Germans and British display more scepticism 
towards the EU than the policies in their own country, albeit that still a majority 
of them feel that things are moving in the wrong direction in their own country. 
How to Talk To Friends about the Union
The scepticism about the way things are progressing in the EU is also reflected 
in responses to the question: “Imagine you talk with a friend or colleague about the 
European Union. Would your conversation 
be 1) very positive, 2) positive, 3) negative, 
or 4) very negative.” Figures 28 through 
31 displays the number of people ei-
ther responding positively (1 or 2) or 
negatively (3 or 4) in the EU28, the Eu-
rozone versus non-Eurozone, across 
regions and in the six largest member 
states respectively. 
These figures indicate that on 
aver age people in the EU28 would be 
equally likely to talk positively about 
the EU to friends than they would be 
to talk negatively (Figure 26). We find 
very little difference between Euro-
zone versus non-Eurozone countries, 
albeit that people outside the Euro-
zone would be slightly more positive 
56 versus 51 percent (Figure 27). 
How Talk About EU?
53%
Positive
47%
Negative
FIGURE 26  People Equally Likely to 
Talk Positively as Negatively About the 
EU to Friends
FIGURE 27   No Big Differences Between
Eurozone and non-Eurozone Countries
Eurozone
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How Talk About EU? NegativePositive
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Yet, when we inspect the diffe rences between regions, it becomes clear that the 
slightly higher positive tone to friends in non-Eurozone countries is primari-
ly driven by responses from the East 
(Figure 28). People within the North 
non-Eurozone would on average be 
more negative about the EU than 
posi tive (53 versus 47 percent). We 
find a similar pattern in the South 
where people would more likely talk 
negatively than positively about the 
EU to friends although the difference 
here is quite small. Finally, if we in-
spect differences across the six larg-
est member states we find that the 
British, French and Italians are the 
least positive about the EU to friends, 
while the Poles are the most positive 
(Figure 29).
In all, these findings suggest 
that in our survey people are on ave-
rage equally likely to talk positively 
as negatively about the EU to friends. 
Yet, in the East, especially in Poland, 
they would by far be the most posi-
tive, while British, French and Italians 
would speak the least positively about 
the EU to friends.
FIGURE 28  People Are More Positive About
the EU in North Eurozone and East
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FIGURE 29   Britons, French and Italians Least
Positive About the EU
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German Leadership in the Union
A final attitude that we will consider before turning to our conjoint experiment 
is a respondent’s view about Germany’s role in the Union. Specifically, we asked 
respondents to consider the follow-
ing: “Germany is often seen as taking a 
leadership role in the European Union. 
Do you think this is 1) very good, 2) good, 
3) bad”. The figures below present the 
share of people either responding that 
they approve of Germany’s leadership 
in the Union (1 and 2) or they do not (3). 
Figure 30 below provides this infor-
mation for the EU as a whole. We find 
that a majority of people approve of 
Germany’s leadership in the Union, 
albeit the difference with disapproval, 
55 versus 45 percent respectively, is 
rather small.
Interestingly, Figure 31 demon-
strates that approval of German lead-
ership is with 59 versus 53 percent 
higher in the non-Eurozone com-
pared to the Eurozone countries.
Comparing approval across the 
different regions (Figure 32) suggests 
that it is the lowest in the southern 
member states and highest in the 
North Eurozone. Considering that 
Germany is the biggest creditor coun-
try and thus largely defends the credi-
tor positions of the North Eurozone 
in the Euro Group against the posi-
tions of debtor countries in the South, 
these differences should not come as 
FIGURE 30   In the EU-28 A Majority Views
Germany‘s Leadership in the Union as Good
Germany‘s Role in Europe?
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FIGURE 31   Approval of Germany’s Leadership
in the Union is Higher in non-Eurozone
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FIGURE 32  Approval of Germany’s Leadership
in the Union is Low in the South
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a surprise. Interestingly, when we look further into this by exploring differences 
across generations in the South (see Table 3), we find that approval in the South 
is actually highest amongst the youngest age cohort between 15 and 25, which is 
unexpected.
Table 3: Oldest and Youngest Generation in the South Most Positive about 
German Leadership in the Union
CohorT % german leaDershiP is gooD
95-76 year olds 50.00
75-56 year olds 39.67
55-46 year olds 36.28
45-36 year olds 35.61
35-26 year olds 40.16
25-15 year olds 51.17
Finally, Figure 33 explores differences in approval of German leadership in the six 
largest member states, and we find that Italians and Spaniards are most scepti-
cal with 71 and 61 percent respectively, 
followed by the British with 52 per-
cent. Approval of German leadership, 
however, is high in France and Poland 
as well as in Germany of course. These 
findings suggest that German leader-
ship is quite contested in the South, 
which might be the result of the Euro-
zone crisis and austerity requirements 
proposed in Brussels largely under 
German leadership. Yet, the finding 
that approval among the youngest 
age cohort between 15 and 25 is with 
roughly 60 percent the highest among 
all cohorts in the South suggests that 
these attitudes might change in the 
future. 
Bad
Germany
Great Britain
Poland
Italy
48%
67%
80% 20%
52%
71%
33%
Spain
39% 61%
France
65% 35%
29%
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art I of the analysis has demonstrated that citizens are largely con-
flicted about Europe. While on the one hand they support membership 
and further integration, on the other they are dissatisfied with overall 
policy direction in the Union, and not particularly enthusiastic about it 
when they talk to friends. While past research often implicitly assumed support 
for European integration to reflect fixed attitudes — either you are pro- or anti- 
EU — our findings echo recent contributions that suggest that it might also be 
useful to think of EU attitudes as inherently variable, namely reflecting differ-
ential degrees of ambivalence (De Vries 2013, De Vries and Steenbergen 2013). For 
example, EU citizens may like the idea of European integration in the abstract as 
secure peaceful state cooperation, but at the same time they may not have much 
appreciation for the actual policies that the EU pursues. Or they may like the 
majority of policies coming from Brussels, but object to the political process that 
yields them. Although many journalists, politicians and pundits often argue that 
the public is increasingly sceptical of further steps towards integration, based 
on the findings presented here we ought to qualify this claim. Public opinion 
towards Europe is best described as ambivalent, and thus we know from previous 
research malleable (Zaller 1992). We seem to be witnessing a process of growing 
uncertainty about the future of the integration process, especially when it comes 
to which policies are pursued. 
Given that public opinion towards European integration is multi-facetted in 
nature we need to carefully craft survey instruments that allow us to understand 
What Kind of Europe 
Do Europeans Want?
Part II
P
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what kinds of European integration and which type of reform Europeans actually 
want. The multi-dimensional and complex nature of public support for European 
integration should thus receive much more scholarly and popular attention. In 
the following pages we provide the first in-depth examination of public sup-
port for different EU reform proposals across member states. Building on and 
extending existing work on public support for European integration that we out-
lined before, we have examined the trade-offs people make between different 
aspects of integration. Specifically, we focused on four dimensions of European 
integration:
1. The functional dimension:  
What type of European integration do EU citizens want?
2. The communal dimension:  
With whom do EU citizens want this integration?
3. The utilitarian dimension:  
How much are EU citizens willing to pay for this integration?
4. The institutional dimension:  
How do EU citizens want this integration be governed?
These different dimensions capture the most important trade-offs that citizens 
face and are thus at the core of our data collection. 
A Note on Understanding the Conjoint Results
In the conjoint experiments used here, we ask respondents to rank and rate five 
sets of two hypothetical choices, in this case reform proposals for the EU. These 
hypothetical choices have multiple attributes, that is to say they vary on four 
different dimensions of European integration outlined above. The goal here is to 
estimate the influence of each attribute of these dimensions (based on a linear 
probability or ordinary regression model) on the choices and ratings of the re-
spondents for a given reform proposal. In order to make sure that alternative ex-
planations are taken care of we the use conjoint method based on a fully rando-
mized design. So what does this mean exactly? Each respondent sees five sets 
of two different reform proposals that differ on the attributes of the functional, 
communal, utilitarian and institutional dimensions and after each individual 
comparison are then asked two questions: first, which proposal (A or B) do you 
prefer, and second how would you rank each of the proposal. The ranking ques-
tion was formulated as follows: “Please also evaluate each option individually. How 
likely is it that you would support ‘Option A’ / ‘Option B’ in a referendum? 1) very likely, 
2) likely, 3) not likely, or 4) not very likely”. Table 4 below provides an example of one 
set of reform proposals that respondents were asked to choose between and rank. 
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Table 4: Example of a Choice in the Conjoint Experiment
Dimension oPTion a oPTion B
How much money should 
every person pay for the EU 
annually? 
€ 211 € 63
Who should make decisions 
in the EU?
National governments Citizens through referenda
How many member states 
should the EU have? 
15 28
What should the primary 
policy goal of the EU be?
Secure Peace and Security Fight Climate Change
Which option do you prefer? O O
The order in which the attributes of the different dimensions were presented 
was fully randomized. This allows us to assess the influence of different features 
of the reform proposals, costs or number of member states for example, on how 
respondents evaluate a given proposal relative to another. One of the advantages 
of randomizing the exact values on the different dimensions that feature on a 
reform proposal is that one does not need to rely on any assumptions about the 
functional form that maps reform proposal features on support (see Hainmueller, 
et al., 2014). Also, the randomization ensures that the treatment groups are 
comparable with respect to alternative explanations, such as the way in which 
they interpret some of the information provided differently. The attributes of 
the different dimensions of the reform proposal are listed in Table 5 below. 
Table 5: Attributes of Different Dimensions
Dimension OPTION A OPTION B
Utilitarian
How much money should 
every person pay for the  
EU annually?
€ 211 
€ 107
€ 63
€ 35
€ 0 
€ 211 
€ 107
€ 63
€ 35
€ 0
Institutional
Who should make decisions 
in the EU?
National governments
Elected EU President
European Commissioners
European Parliament
Citizens through referenda
National governments
Elected EU President
European Commissioners
European Parliament
Citizens through referenda
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Dimension oPTion a oPTion B
Communal
How many member states 
should the EU have?
40
35
28
15
6
40
35
28
15
6
Functional
What should the primary 
policy goal of the EU be?
Secure Peace and Security
Reduce Inequality
Promote Economic Growth
Secure Energy Safety
Regulate Immigration
Fight Climate Change
Secure Peace and Security
Reduce Inequality
Promote Economic Growth
Secure Energy Safety
Regulate Immigration
Fight Climate Change
   
Interpreting conjoint results is less straightforward than the survey results 
presented in Part I, but really not difficult. As one can see in Figure 35, which 
presents the conjoint results for the EU28, the y-axis lists all the different fea-
tures of each of the four dimensions: the utilitarian, institutional, communal 
and functional dimension. On the x-axis, the size of the effect of each attri bute, 
for example 15 member states or a €35 annual contribution, on the choice for one 
of the two reform proposals is presented.41If the effect of an attribute is large 
and positive then this attribute makes people prefer an EU reform proposal more, 
whereas if the size of the effect is large and negative it indicates that this at-
tribute of the proposal makes people prefer an EU reform proposal less. Note 
that the sizes of the effects are always presented in reference to the current EU, 
i.e. the status quo. That is to say, we present the effect of the different annu-
al costs in reference to the average annual cost per capita (for the EU28 this is 
€0); the effect of different decision-making bodies in reference to the European 
Parliament making decisions; the effect of a different number of member states 
in reference to the current number of 28; and finally, the effect of different policy 
goals in reference to the promotion of economic growth. The thing that is impor-
tant to take away from the graph is that if the size of the effect for a particular 
attribute, designated by the dot (the line around it provides the 95% confidence 
interval around the estimated coefficient), takes on a value greater than 0, peo-
ple wish to see a change in the EU away from the status quo. When the size of the 
effect is smaller than 0, people prefer the status quo over the proposed reform. 
If dots for an attribute are on the red line in the figures this shows that people 
are indiffe rent about this reform and the status quo, while dots to the right of 
the red line indicate a preference for change away from the status quo, and dots 
to the left of the red line indicate a preference for the status quo rather than the 
proposed reform. 
4 This number equates to the size of a coefficient from a linear probability model with the support for the EU 
reform proposal as the outcome variable.
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Support for EU Reform Proposals
Let us inspect the support for EU reform in the EU as a whole (Figure 34). The re-
sults show that people desire two changes to the current status quo: namely that 
decisions are taken by referenda rather than by the European Parliament, and 
that the EU focus is primarily on peace and security issues rather than econo mic 
growth. People are indifferent about raising the average contribution to €35 in the 
EU compared to the current level of €0, and about national governments or the 
European Parliament making decisions. In terms of reforms that people oppose, 
we find that in terms of costs people do not want to contribute much more to the 
EU annual budget than €35 per capita per year. When it comes to decision-making, 
people are strongly opposed to the notion of an elected European President or 
the Commission taking decisions. They prefer the European Parliament doing so. 
In terms of membership, they strongly oppose a smaller Union, but interesting-
ly are slightly less opposed to an EU with more member states, albeit that they 
display a slight preference for the EU of its current size. Finally, people prefer an 
EU promoting economic growth over other policy goals such as securing energy 
safety, combating climate change or regulating immigration. 
FIGURE 34   Support for EU Reform in 28 Member States
€ 211
€ 107
€ 67
€ 35
National Governments
Elected European President
European Commission
Citizen Referenda
6 Members
15 Members
35 Members
40 Members
Peace & Security
Social Inequality
Energy Safety
Immigration
Climate Change
neutral positivenegative
Costs
Decisions
Members
Goals
39
PART II:  WHAT kInd of euRoPe do euRoPeAns WAnT EUPINIONS  WHAT do THe PeoPle WAnT?
Overall, Figure 34 provides us with a first peak into Europeans’ EU reform pref-
erences and shows that making decisions by referenda and making the EU fo-
cus more on peace and security are important reform considerations for the 
average citizen. Yet, these results for the EU as a whole may mask important 
cross-national variation. Figures 35A through D below present the same results, 
but split by region. The interpretation of these graphs is identical for that of 
Figure 34 except for the fact that the reference-point for the status quo when it 
comes to costs, i.e. the annual per capita contribution to the EU budget, varies by 
region. For the North Eurozone (Figure 37A), the status quo is € 67, for the North 
Non-Eurozone €  107, for the South € 35, and finally for the East the average con-
tribution per capita is € 0. 
FIGURE 35A   Support for EU Reform in the North Eurozone
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Figure 35A shows that citizens residing in the North Eurozone  favour a Union 
that is slightly cheaper in terms of annual contribution per capita, albeit the ef-
fects for € 0 and € 35 compared to the current level of € 67 are rather small. They 
clearly oppose an increase in the annual contribution to a level of € 107 or € 211. 
In terms of decision-making, they are indifferent about decisions being made by 
national governments or the Commission compared to the European Parliament, 
while they  favour citizen referenda. As in the EU as a whole, citizens in the North 
Eurozone are far from enthusiastic about the notion of an elected European 
President making decisions. In fact, they clearly oppose it. In terms of member-
ship, they clearly oppose a small EU of only six member states, while they are 
only slightly negatively predisposed to an EU that comprises 15, 35 or 40 mem-
ber states compared to the current 28. In terms of the policy goals that the EU 
should pursue, they strongly  favour peace and security over economic growth 
even more so than was the case for the EU28, but an EU that focuses on social 
inequality, immigration or climate change is equally preferable to one that pro-
motes economic growth. Citizens in the North Eurozone do prefer an EU that 
focuses on economic growth over one whose primary concern is energy safety. 
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FIGURE 35B   Support for EU Reform in the North non-Eurozone
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Turning to citizens in the North non-Eurozone, the British, Danes and Swedes 
display similar reform preferences compared to their counterparts in the North 
Eurozone, expect for their decision-making and policy preferences. Contrary to 
citizens in the North Eurozone, British, Danes and Swedes are much more in  fa-
vour of decisions taken either through citizen referenda or by national govern-
ments. They seem wearier of EU institutions making decisions, especially were it 
to be an elected European President. In terms of policy goals that the EU should 
pursue, peace and security is highest on their agenda followed by economic 
growth and immigration (on the latter two the British, Danes and Swedes are in-
different.) Contrary to the North Eurozone citizens, however, they would be less 
in  favour of an EU focusing on social inequality and climate change. 
In the South, we find that citizens’ strongest preference for a change re-
lates to citizen referenda; these are much preferred over decision-making by the 
European Parliament. Like citizens in the North, they prefer an EU that is cheaper, 
FIGURE 35C   Support for EU Reform in the South
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and oppose a smaller versus a larger EU in terms of member states. When it 
comes to policy preferences, they differ from the North in that they are indiffe-
rent about an EU that focuses on economic growth or one that prioritizes peace 
and security. Given that the South was hit hard by the Eurozone crisis, a strong 
preference for an EU that promotes growth should not come as a surprise. 
FIGURE 35D   Support for EU Reform in the East
Costs
Decisions
Members
Goals
€ 211
€ 107
€ 67
€ 35
National Governments
Elected European President
European Commission
Citizen Referenda
6 Members
15 Members
35 Members
40 Members
Peace & Security
Social Inequality
Energy Safety
Immigration
Climate Change
neutral positivenegative
 
The final region we consider is the East and these results feature in Figure 35D. 
People in the East display even more differences to the North than we found 
for the South. Interestingly, they are willing to do more for the EU than they 
currently do, paying even up to € 107 a year. This pattern deviates from all oth-
er regions where citizens are not willing to pay more. Citizens in the East, like 
those in the North Non-Eurozone, are weary of EU institutions taking decisions, 
especially a directly elected President. They  favour citizen referenda but are in-
different about national government vis-à-vis the European Parliament. They 
strongly oppose the idea of a smaller EU, and are indifferent about an EU with 28 
versus a Union with 35 or 40 member states. Finally, like the South, Central- and 
East- European citizens are most supportive of an EU that deals with economic 
growth or peace and security, these policy goals are much more preferred to pol-
icies like combating climate change or regulating immigration. 
How are EU reform preferences distributed across the six big member states? 
Figures 36A through F show the results of the conjoint experiment in Germany, 
France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Poland, respectively. In Germany, we 
find that people prefer an EU that is cheaper, and are equally  favourable about 
the prospect of an EU that would have 15, 35 or 40 member states compared to 
28. Germans most strongly differ from the EU as a whole in terms of their de-
cision-making or policy preferences. They support decision-making through 
referenda compared to the European Parliament, but are equally happy with an 
EU in which decisions are made by national governments or the Commission. In-
terestingly, they also seem much less opposed to the idea of a directly elected EU 
President compared to citizens in the EU as a whole. In terms of policy, German 
citizens strongly  favour peace and security as the EU’s main policy goal. Peace 
and security is preferred over economic growth, but expect for a slight opposition 
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to energy safety, Germans are indifferent between other goals, such as immigra-
tion, climate change or social inequality.
FIGURE 36A   Support for EU Reform in Germany
Costs
Decisions
Members
Goals
€ 211
€ 107
€ 35
€ 0
National Governments
Elected European President
European Commission
Citizen Referenda
6 Members
15 Members
35 Members
40 Members
Peace & Security
Social Inequality
Energy Safety
Immigration
Climate Change
neutral positivenegative
French opinion resembles the Germans’ opinion in many respects. But more than 
the Germans, the French are indifferent about the European Parliament making 
decisions or a directly elected EU President (Figure 36B). This might reflect their 
national experience with an elected President. Like the Germans, however, the 
French do  favour decisions being made via citizen referenda, but are indifferent 
about national governments or an EU institution taking decisions. The French 
favour the current number of member states over a smaller EU or larger one. In 
terms of policies, they differ slightly from the Germans in that they  favour an EU 
that addresses social inequality, immigration and economic growth to an equal 
extent. 
FIGURE 36B   Support for EU Reform in France
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The British hold different opinions about EU reform compared to the Germans 
and French (Figure 36C). They differ mostly in terms of decision-making prefe-
rences as they clearly  favour decisions being made by national governments or 
via EU referenda rather than by the European Parliament. These effects are quite 
substantial. This British preference for decision-making by national govern-
ments is clearly different than the overall EU pattern. In terms of preferred policy 
goals, they are, like the Germans, in  favour of peace and security, followed by 
immigration and economic growth. 
FIGURE 36C   Support for EU Reform in Great Britain
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Figure 36D shows the results for the Italian representative sample. The Italians 
like the British, Germans and French  favour a cheaper EU compared to their cur-
rent contribution of € 107, and want an EU that comprises more than six mem-
ber states. They, like the citizens in the EU as a whole,  favour citizen referenda, 
and oppose a directly elected EU President. Contrary to the British, Germans and 
French, however, Italian citizens are strongly in  favour of an EU that promotes 
economic growth, slightly more so than peace and security and immigration.
The results for Spain, which are displayed in Figure 36E, show that like the 
Italians, Spanish citizens strongly  favour citizen referenda over EU decisions be-
ing made by the European Parliament. They also  favour a bigger EU with at least 
six member states. Like the Italians, they support an EU reform proposal more 
when it is focused on promoting economic growth, yet contrary to the Italians 
they  favour growth equally to social inequality and peace and security. Interes-
tingly, in terms of annual costs, Spaniards seem to be willing to pay a bit more for 
the EU as they currently do. They are equally supportive of a reform proposal that 
would mean paying € 35 compared to their current € 0 (they are a net recipient). 
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FIGURE 36D   Support for EU Reform in Italy
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Finally, the Poles are strongly opposed to a smaller EU, and clearly  favour an EU 
that deals with peace and security over economic growth followed by social ine-
quality. Similar to the Italians, they are indifferent about national governments, 
the Commission or the European Parliament making decisions, while clearly  fa-
vouring decision-making via citizen referenda. Like the Spaniards, the Poles are 
currently net recipients, and even willing to pay more than the Spaniards for the 
EU, namely a contribution of up to € 67 per capita annually. 
Overall, our inspection of the support for EU reform across the EU as a whole, 
within regions, and in the six largest member states has revealed that people 
prefer a larger over a smaller Union. They prefer an EU in which citizens make 
decisions through referenda rather than the European Parliament, their national 
governments or other EU institutions, and they strongly oppose a directly elected 
EU President. On average, they feel that the primary policy goal of the Union 
should be to safeguard peace and security over economic growth. Yet, important 
cross-national differences exist. For example, the Spaniard and Poles currently 
FIGURE 36E   Support for EU Reform in Spain
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net recipients of the EU budget, are willing to pay slightly more for the EU in 
the future. The French are equally enthusiastic about the prospect of decisions 
being taken by directly elected President compared to the European Parliament, 
while the Brits prefer national governments being in control, at least equally to 
decision-making via referenda. Finally, we find differences based on people’s 
policy preferences, while people in the South and East care most about economic 
growth, citizens of the North  favour a Union dealing with peace and security and 
view immigration of equal importance to growth. Now we will turn to individual 
level differences based on socio-demographics, like age gender, as well as people’s 
levels of EU regime or policy support. 
FIGURE 36F   Support for EU Reform in Poland
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Differences in Support for Reform Proposals Across Generations 
Figures 37A and 37B below show EU reform preferences across generations. We 
have plotted divergent preferences about how decisions should be made in the 
EU and which policy goal should be pursued only, as generations largely degree 
on costs and the number of member states. They prefer a cheaper Union and 
are opposed to a smaller number of member states (see figures in the Appen-
dix). Figure 39A shows that while all generations prefer EU reform proposals in 
which decisions are being made via referenda over those in which the European 
Parliament makes decisions, only the youngest generation of 15 to 25 year-olds 
opposes decision-making by national governments over decisions being tak-
en by the EP. This lack of enthusiasm about national government involvement 
in the EU among the young provides an interesting prospect for integration in 
the future. This generation seems less in  favour of intergovernmental decision- 
making than their slightly older peers.
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FIGURE 37A   Different Views on Reform of Decision-Making Across Generations
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When it comes to policy preferences we also find interesting differences across 
generations (Figure 37B). While older generations support an EU that promotes 
economic growth equally to one that safeguards peace and security, the 15 to 25 
year-olds display a slight preference for an EU that deals with peace and security. 
This effect is of similar size in fact to the one for the over 55 year-olds, although 
the latter effect fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance in-
dicating that for the oldest generation peace and security is also very important, 
but equal to economic growth. The finding that the youngest generation  favours 
reform proposals in which the primary policy goal of the EU is establishing peace 
and security is particularly interesting given that many argue that this reason for 
unification in Europe is something younger people relate to less given that they 
lack war experiences. Our results indicate that this commonly held opinion lacks 
a clear empirical foundation. 
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FIGURE 37B   Different Views on Reform of Policy Goals Across Generations
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Another interesting difference across generations exists when it comes to im-
migration as an EU policy goal. While citizenscitizens younger than 55 prefer EU 
proposals that promote economic growth over those that regulate immigration, 
the oldest generation is indifferent between the two. 
We delve deeper into divergent preferences between generations when it 
comes to the policy goals that the EU should pursue by exploring these within 
the different regions (Figures 38A-D). Several interesting findings stand out. In 
the North Eurozone for example, we find that the youngest generation prefers an 
EU that maintains peace and security or that fights climate change over one that 
promotes economic growth, while older generations would like to see peace and 
security as the primary policy goal of the EU followed by economic growth. We 
already found that dealing with climate change in a EU context is mainly viewed 
as important in the North Eurozone (see Figure 38A), these findings suggest that 
this especially true for the 15 to 25 years-olds. 
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FIGURE 38A   Different Views on Reform of Policy Goals Across Generations in the North Eurozone
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Citizens residing in the North Non-Eurozone prefer immigration equally to eco-
nomic growth (Figure 35B), but Figure 38B indicates that this is primarily driven 
by the preferences of the over 55-year-old generation. Younger generations  favour 
an EU that promotes economic growth over one that regulates immigration.
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FIGURE 38B  Different Views on Reform of Policy Goals Across Generations in the North non-Eurozone
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In the South, we find that the regulation of immigration is viewed as equally im-
portant to the promotion of economic growth in the EU context by all genera-
tions expect for the youngest one. Interestingly, both the oldest and youngest 
generation prefer an EU that maintains peace and security over one that pro-
motes growth. Younger generations are indifferent about an EU fighting climate 
change to one that secures growth contrary compared to older ones that clearly 
favour growth (Figure 38C). 
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FIGURE 38C   Different Views on Reform of Policy Goals Across Generations in the South
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Finally, Figure 38D shows that generations in the East differ only in respect to 
their preferences for peace and security and immigration. While the oldest gen-
eration  favours an EU that regulates immigration equally to one that secures 
growth, the youngest generation in Eastern Europe has a clear preference about 
what the main policy goal of the EU should be, namely peace and security. 
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FIGURE 38D  Different Views on Reform of Policy Goals Across Generations in the East
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Next to regional variation (for full results see figures in the Appendix), our ev-
idence also provides interesting variation across generations within the six 
largest member states. Within these six countries, generations differ mainly in 
terms of their decision-making preferences (for full results see figures in the 
Appendix). Figure 39A shows that while the older generations in Great Britain 
favour national governments making decisions in the EU over the European 
Parliament, younger Brits between 15 and 25 years-old are indifferent between 
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the two. Interestingly, the British results also indicate that the preference for 
citizen referenda as documented in Figure 36C is not shared by the oldest and 
youngest generation, they are both indifferent about decisions being taken by 
referenda or the European Parliament. 
In Germany, however, we find that citizen referenda as a means to take deci-
sions in the EU is only really supported by citizens over 55 years-old, the younger 
generations favour referenda equally to decision-making by the European Par-
liament (Figure 39B). In general generations in Germany largely agree on other 
ways in which decisions ought to be taken in the EU. Interestingly, and contrary 
to the German case, in France we find that the younger generations, specifically 
those below 35, favour citizen referenda over European decisions taken by the 
European Parliament (Figure 39C).
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FIGURE 39A  Different Views on Reform of Decision-Making Across Generations in Great Britain 
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FIGURE 39B  Different Views on Reform of Decision-Making Across Generations in Germany
National Governments
Elected European President
European Commission
Citizen Referenda
positiveneutralnegative
51
PART II:  WHAT kInd of euRoPe do euRoPeAns WAnT EUPINIONS  WHAT do THe PeoPle WAnT?
. 
Over 55
Over 45
Over 35
Over 25
Over 15
FIGURE 39C  Different Views on Reform of Decision-Making Across Generations in France
National Governments
Elected European President
European Commission
Citizen Referenda
neutral positivenegative
Similar to the French case, and thus contrary to the German findings, we find 
that younger Spaniards and Italians compared to older generations are much 
more in  favour of decision-making in the EU taking place via citizen referenda 
rather than through the European Parliament (see Figures 39D-E).
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FIGURE 39D  Different Views on Reform of Decision-Making Across Generations in Spain
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In Poland we find that while older generations opposed to the notion of a directly 
elected EU President taking decisions, the youngest generation is indifferent bet - 
ween a President or the European Parliament taking decisions (Figure 39F). In 
addition, younger Poles are largely indifferent about decision-making via the 
European Parliament or national governments, while the above 55-year-olds are 
opposed to the idea of national governments rather than the European Parlia-
ment making decisions. 
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FIGURE 39E  Different Views on Reform of Decision-Making Across Generations in Italy
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So, when it comes to differences based on age, we find that generations primar-
ily disagree about decision-making and policy goals in the EU. For example in 
France, Italy and Spain younger generations  favour citizens as the main deci-
sion makers via referenda, while in Germany only older generations do. When 
it comes to policy preferences, we find that both the oldest and youngest gene-
rations  favour an EU that safeguards peace and security over one that promotes 
growth. This demonstrates that citizen support for the original idea behind 
European unification is not just popular among older generations who were 
socialized in times of World War II or the Cold War.
Over 55
Over 45
Over 35
Over 25
Over 15
FIGURE 39F  Different Views on Reform of Decision-Making Across Generations in Poland
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 Differences in Support for Reform Proposals  
Across Men and Women
In the previous section, we uncovered interesting differences between gene-
rations, how about differences between men and women? Figure 40 below pro-
vides an overview of the different views about EU reform between men and women 
in the EU as a whole. Interestingly, we find very few differences between the 
sexes. The only statistically significant difference exists when it comes to policy 
preferences: women are more in  favour of an EU that deals with peace and secu-
rity in respect to economic growth than men. On the whole, however, we find no 
real differences between men and women in the EU as a whole, across regions or 
within the six largest member states (for full results see figures in the Appendix). 
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Differences in Support for Reform Proposals  
Across Eurosceptics and Euro-supporters 
Now we turn to differences in EU reform preferences based on level of regime 
and policy support. In Part I of this report, we provided an overview of EU prefe-
rences and demonstrated that on the whole our survey respondents were in fact 
quite knowledgeable about the EU. In Figure 41 we now explore if people’s factual 
knowledge — i.e. did they know that Switzerland is not an EU member or that 
not all countries have the same number of European parliamentarians — also 
mediates their preferences for EU reform. The results indicate that people with 
high and low knowledge about the EU in fact differ very little in terms of EU 
reform preferences. People with less knowledge are slightly more in favour of 
an EU that is cheaper, albeit these differences are by no means large, and people 
with higher knowledge demonstrate a clearer preference for an EU of 28 mem-
ber states or one that is perhaps even larger. Figures in the Appendix present 
the reform preferences split by EU knowledge across regions and the six largest 
member states, and indeed show that very little difference exists. 
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FIGURE 41  Different Views on EU Reform Based on Knowledge About the EU
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These findings indicate that reform preferences do not differ substantial-
ly across citizens with high and low knowledge about the EU. This is in some 
ways good news for our conjoint experiment. Both respondents with high and 
low levels of EU knowledge provided coherent preferences that intuitively make 
sense, that is to say that they all prefer a cheaper EU of more or less the current 
size that is predominantly designed to safeguard peace and security as well as 
promote economic growth, and about which they themselves can decide in refe-
renda. Yet, based on the findings we presented in Part I we also know that peo-
ple differ substantially when it comes to regime and policy support. Although a 
majority supports membership and further integration, people are much more 
divided about the Euro and the overall policy direction of the Union. Against this 
backdrop it seems pertinent to explore if these diverging levels of regime and 
policy support in fact mediate EU reform preferences.
Figures 42A and B display people’s EU reform preferences by their support 
for EU and Euro membership. Interestingly, the results are very similar across 
these two types of support. Membership-sceptics and Eurosceptics  favour an EU 
that is cheaper; they are less opposed to a lower number of member states; they 
favour an EU that deals with peace and security like their counterparts who sup-
port membership and the Euro, but differ in that they are indifferent between an 
EU that would regulate immigration versus one that promotes economic growth. 
Membership-supporters and Euro-supporters clearly  favour growth. Immigra-
tion thus seems a key concern for membership-sceptics and Eurosceptics. That 
said, the largest difference between supporters and sceptics stems from their 
views about who ought to take decisions in the Union. Membership-sceptics and 
Eurosceptics are more opposed to EU institutions taking decisions and strongly 
favour decisions being made by referenda or national governments rather than 
by the European Parliament. This latter finding is especially interesting as it 
suggests that in terms of EU reform preferences, sceptics — either based on mem-
bership, the Euro, or both — clearly  favour a Union that guarantees more national- 
based versus European-based control, either by means of citizen referenda in 
which national publics decide or through citizen representation via national 
governments. 
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FIGURE 42A  Different Views on EU Reform Based on Membership Support
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It is interesting to see that these differences between sceptics and suppor ters 
when it comes to membership are stable across regions (Figures 43A-D).
Membership-sceptics in all regions clearly  favour national governments or citi-
zens deciding per referenda over the European Parliament. In the North, sceptics 
also strongly prefer immigration to be the EU’s primary policy goal over eco-
nomic growth, while in the South and East membership-sceptics are indifferent 
between immigration and growth. We find very similar patterns across the six 
largest member states (see figures in the Appendix) and across regions and the 
big six when it comes to sceptics and supporters of the Euro (see figures in the 
Appendix). 
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FIGURE 42B  Different Views on EU Reform Based on Euro Support
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FIGURE 43A  Different Views on EU Reform Based on Membership Support in the North Eurozone
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FIGURE 43B  Different Views on EU Reform Based on Membership Support in the North non-Eurozone
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FIGURE 43C  Different Views on EU Reform Based on Membership Support in the South
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FIGURE 43D  Different Views on EU Reform Based on Membership Support in the East
€ 211
€ 107
€ 67
€ 0
National Governments
Elected European President
European Commission
Citizen Referenda
6 Members
15 Members
35 Members
40 Members
Peace & Security
Social Inequality
Energy Safety
Immigration
Climate Change
neutral positivenegative
58
PART II:  WHAT kInd of euRoPe do euRoPeAns WAnT EUPINIONS  WHAT do THe PeoPle WAnT?
Figure 44 shows the differences in EU refrom preferences based on people’s sup-
port for further political and economic integration in Europe. Here we divide re-
spondents into three groups based on their responses to the question: “If you 
had to choose, which of the following statements best describes your overall attitude 
towards European integration? 1) We need more political and economic integration 
across Europe (more integration), 2) Things should remain as they are today (status quo), 
3) We need less political and economic integration across Europe (less integration)”. The 
findings indicate that people who  favour less political and economic integration 
in Europe have very similar reform attitudes compared to membership-sceptics 
and Eurosceptics, namely they prefer national governments or citizens in refe-
renda deciding policy in the EU rather than the European Parliament. Also, they 
favour an EU that regulates immigration equally to one that promotes economic 
growth. Finally, they prefer an EU that is cheaper compared to those citizens who 
want more integration or support the status quo. 
People who want less political and economic integration thus differ most from 
those who want more or those who prefer the status quo based on their deci-
sion-making and policy preferences. We will explore these differences more in-
depth by comparing regions in Figures 45A-D in the next pages. 
Citizens in the North Eurozone who want less political and economic in-
tegration  favour an EU in which decisions are made via referenda or through 
national government representatives, yet they are largely indifferent about any 
of the EU institutions, Commission, President or European Parliament, making 
decisions. People who  favour more integration in the North Eurozone are largely 
indifferent about who should take decisions in the Union, with the exception that 
they clearly oppose the idea of a directly elected European President doing so. 
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FIGURE 44  Different Views on EU Reform Based Integration Preferences
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Status QuoMore Integration Less Integration
FIGURE 45A  Different Views on EU Decision-Making and Policy Goals in the North Eurozone
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All citizens regardless of their integration preferences wish to see an EU that 
focuses more on peace and security than economic growth, but they are more or 
less indifferent about growth versus climate change or social inequality. Citizens 
in the North Eurozone that  favour the status quo or want less integration prefer 
an EU that regulates immigration equally to one that promotes growth. 
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FIGURE 45B  Different Views on EU Decision-Making and Policy Goals in the North non-Eurozone
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People in the North non-Eurozone show similar preferences in terms of decision- 
making compared to those in the North Eurozone, but those that prefer less po-
litical and economic integration are clearly more in favour of an EU that reg-
ulates immigration over one that facilitates growth (Figure 45B). People who 
want to see more integration in Europe and reside in the North Non-Eurozone 
clearly support the promotion of growth over the regulation of immigration as 
the EU’s primary policy goal, while those that  favour the status quo are large-
ly indifferent. While in the North Eurozone those that want less integration 
prefer the EU to focus on maintaining peace and security, those in the North 
non-Eurozone are indifferent between growth and peace and security.
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Contrary to the North, all people in the South regardless of their EU prefe rences 
favour decision-making via referenda (Figure 45C). Those that want less integra-
tion are slightly more in  favour of national governments taking decisions over 
the European Parliament compared to those who want more integration, but this 
difference is slightly smaller compared to the North. In terms of policy prefer-
ences, sceptics of further integration are indifferent between social inequality, 
peace and security, immigration and growth. These could all be the core policy 
area the EU should deal with, but they strongly oppose an EU focused on energy 
safety and climate change over growth. 
In terms of policy preferences, we find that the differences between those 
favouring more, less or the same integration in the East are rather small, except 
for those in  favour of less integration being indifferent between immigration or 
growth being the EU’s primary policy goal (Figure 45D). When it comes to de-
cision-making preferences, sceptics of further integration in the East largely 
resemble those in the North, they prefer national governments or citizens via 
referenda taking decisions. Full results can found in the Appendix, also for the 
six largest countries (see figures in the Appendix).
Status QuoMore Integration Less Integration
FIGURE 45C  Different Views on EU Decision-Making and Policy Goals in the South
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Finally, we turn to how people’s views about the overall policy direction in the 
EU and in their own country mediate their EU reform preferences (Figures 46 
and 47 respectively). Interestingly, the results for those that oppose the overall 
policy direction in the EU are extremely similar compared to those opposing the 
overall policy direction in their country. These dissatisfied citizens want the EU 
to be cheaper, to stick to its current size of 28 member states, and to be ruled 
through national governments or via citizen referenda. The findings presented 
in Figures 46 and 47 resemble those for membership-, integration- and Euro-
sceptics reported earlier when it comes to decision-making preferences. Citi-
zens who are sceptical about the policy direction in the EU (and in their country) 
wish decisions to be made by national governments and via EU referenda, and 
not by EU institutions. Those who approve of the overall policy direction in the 
EU or their national country, however, are indifferent between contributions of 
€ 0, € 35 or € 67, strongly oppose to national governments or a directly elected EU 
President taking decisions over the European Parliament. Yet, they are indiffer-
ent about the Commission, the European Parliament or citizens taking decisions 
Status QuoMore Integration Less Integration
FIGURE 45D  Different Views on EU Decision-Making and Policy Goals in the East
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FIGURE 46  Different Views on EU Reform Based Evaluation of EU Policy Direction
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FIGURE 47  Different Views on EU Reform Based Evaluation of National Policy Direction
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via referenda, or an EU of 28, 35 or 40 member states. Citizens that are dissat-
isfied with the policy direction in the EU or their country differ least from those 
who are satisfied when it comes to policy preferences. These results are remark-
ably stable across regions and the six largest member states (see figures in the 
Appendix). 
Overall, the largest difference between supporters and sceptics, be it in terms 
of membership, the Euro, integration or policies, stems from their views about 
who ought to take decisions in the Union. Compared to supporters, sceptics are 
much more opposed to a Union in which decisions are made by European actors 
rather than national ones. It seems that the type of EU reform that sceptics most 
want to see is that a move towards more intergovernmental decision making. An 
increase of national control is preferred either by means of citizen referenda in 
which national publics decide or through national governments. 
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Short Summary  
of Key Findings
What Stands Out About EU Citizens’ European Preferences?
1. Support for membership is high throughout the Union. It is the lowest in 
Great Britain, even though a majority of Britons would still vote for EU mem-
bership in a referendum. 
2. A majority of people in the Eurozone support the Euro, and support for the 
Euro is the highest in the southern member states, even though these popu-
lations were hardest hit by the Eurozone crisis. That said, citizens in non- 
Eurozone countries strongly oppose the Euro, and support for the Euro is low-
est in Great Britain. 
3. On average, people  favour more political and economic integration in the 
future. But this support is slightly higher in countries that are part of the 
Eurozone. It is especially high in the southern member states. The fact that 
southern member states are on average more supportive of integration is in-
teresting as they have experienced the adverse impact of the Eurozone crisis 
and had to deal with controversial austerity policies as a result.
4. While support for the European regime (measured by support for member-
ship and in the Eurozone support for the Euro) is high, European policy sup-
port is low. EU citizens are dissatisfied with policy direction in the EU, more 
so in the South, and especially in Italy. That said, people are equally dissa-
tisfied with policy direction in their own country, less so though in Germany 
and Great Britain.
5. Europeans see the opening of borders and economic growth as the EU’s big-
gest achievements, while they view peace and security and the fostering of 
economic growth as Europe’s biggest policy needs. 
6. When asked if they would talk positively or negatively about the EU to friends, 
EU citizens are on average equally likely to do either. Yet, people in non-Euro- 
zone countries are more optimistic, a difference driven primarily by citizens 
in the East. The Danish, British and Swedish are more negative. 
7. EU citizens are on average positive about German leadership in the Union, al-
though in the South, Germany’s role in the Eurozone crisis is evaluated quite 
negatively. Interestingly, however, the results suggest that the youngest 
generation of 15- to 25-year-olds in the South holds the most positive views 
about German leadership. 
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What Stands Out About Preferences for EU Reform?
1. On average, people prefer an EU that is not too expensive, and of more or less 
the current size (28 member states). They want an EU that is predominantly 
designed to safeguard peace and security, as well as to promote economic 
growth, and about which they themselves can make decisions in referenda.
2. People in the EU as a whole strongly oppose the idea of a directly elected EU 
President taking decisions, even those that clearly  favour more political and 
economic integration in the future. People are on average largely indiffe-
rent about national governments or the European Parliament being the key 
decision-makers.
3. Important cross-national differences in EU reform preferences exist. For 
example, the Spaniards and Poles, currently net recipients of the EU budget, 
are willing to pay more for the EU in the future, while Britons, French, 
Germans and Italians — all net contributors — are not. The French are 
equally enthusiastic about the prospect of decisions being taken by a directly 
elected President compared to the European Parliament, while the British 
clearly prefer national governments being in control or decisions being made 
through referenda. Finally, we find differences based on policy preferences: 
while people in the South and East care about economic growth, citizens of 
the North  favour a Union dealing with peace and security. The view the reg-
ulation of immigration of equal importance to growth. 
4. Although we find no differences based on gender, EU reform preferences do 
differ based on age. Generations primarily disagree about who should take 
decisions in the EU and what policy goals the EU should focus on. In France, 
Italy and Spain for example, younger generations  favour decision-making 
via referenda rather than the European Parliament, while in Germany old-
er generations do. When it comes to policy preferences, we find that both 
the oldest and youngest generations in the EU  favour an EU that safeguards 
peace and security over one that promotes growth. 
5. When it comes to how EU preferences mediate support for EU reform, we 
find no differences based on the level of EU knowledge. Yet, we do find clear 
differences based on Europeans’ overall scepticism about the EU. Regard-
less of whether people are sceptical about their country’s membership in the 
Union, the Euro, further political and economic integration, or the overall 
policy direction in the Union, sceptics differ primarily in their views about 
who ought to take decisions. In contrast to supporters, sceptics are much 
more opposed to a Union in which European actors make policy. The type 
of EU reform that sceptics most want to see is towards more national con-
trol, either by means of citizen referenda, in which national publics decide, 
or through national governments. 
6. Next to more intergovernmental decision-making, sceptics also value an EU 
that regulates immigration more; some even prefer it to one that promotes 
economic growth. 
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Concluding Remarks
This report provides the first in-depth examination of public support for dif-
ferent EU reform proposals across member states; it also presents insight into 
Europeans’ support of the EU as such and its policies. The findings lead to four 
conclusions. First, while regime support — captured through positive citizen 
preferences about membership, further political and economic integration, 
and in the Eurozone about the Euro — is high throughout the Union, satisfac-
tion with the overall policy direction in the Union is not. Although in July 2015 
Europeans by-and-large subscribe to the idea of a united Europe, they are worried 
about Brussels’ overall policy direction. While EU citizens view the opening of 
borders and economic growth as the EU’s biggest achievements, they view peace 
and security and the fostering of economic growth as Europe’s biggest policy 
challenges. Those that are more opposed to the idea of the EU also view the regu-
lation of immigration as a key policy challenge for that the EU. On the one hand, 
these findings are reassuring for proponents of the European project: even at a 
time of considerable economic and political turmoil in the Union, support for 
the EU is considerable. Yet, on the other hand, they give rise to concern. If the 
actions of elites fail to meet public expectations over a long period of time, a 
decrease in policy support for the EU may lead to a decrease in regime support 
and thus threaten the popular legitimacy of the project as a whole (see Scharpf 
1999). Against this backdrop, it is crucial for the Union to undertake some kind 
of reform to meet citizen demand, especially when it comes to specific policies. 
This leads us to the second conclusion, namely concerning the kind of change 
that citizens wish to see — and which could secure support for the Union in years 
to come. We find that while people are indifferent to raising the average annual 
contribution to € 35 (compared to the current level of €0 per capita), they are not 
willing to pay much more than that. In terms of decision-making, they prefer 
citizen referenda. Of all of the EU actors, they prefer the European Parliament 
to take decisions, and are strongly opposed to the notion of an elected European 
President. In terms of size, they  favour the status quo of 28 member states. And 
when it comes to policy, EU citizens prefer an EU that focuses on peace and secu-
rity issues, and after that promotes economic growth. 
Yet, we also find that key differences exist, especially between those who are 
more supportive versus those more sceptical about the EU. Regardless of people 
being sceptical about their country’s membership in the Union, the Euro, further 
political and economic integration or the overall policy direction in the Union, 
sceptics differ primarily in their views about who ought to take decisions in the 
Union. In contrast to supporters, sceptics are much more opposed to a Union in 
which EU actors decide on policy. The type of EU reform that sceptics most want 
to see is a move towards more national control, either by means of citizen refe-
renda in which national publics decide or through national governments. Next 
to a more intergovernmental mode of decision making, sceptics also value an 
EU that regulates immigration more, some even prefer it to one that promotes 
economic growth. The problem with catering to the preferences of sceptics is 
that it could alienate those who are supportive of the EU. For example, allowing 
more intergovernmental decision-making would foster support among those 
most critical, but at the same time it would most likely alienate younger genera-
tions of Europeans. Hence, simultaneously addressing the reform preferences of 
sceptics and supporters, of the young and the old, and of people from different 
regions may prove very difficult. 
67
short summary of key findingsEUPINIONS  What do the people Want?
Yet, there are some reforms that could be implemented that would increase 
support among many groups throughout the EU. Interestingly, our results indi-
cate that people care deeply about who governs them. We know from democratic 
theory that people do care about getting what they want, at least some of the 
time, in a representative democratic system like the EU. But they are also con-
cerned about procedural aspects. In the words of the famous democratic theorist 
Robert Dahl (1989: 108): “each person should receive an […] equal chance to gain the 
scarce item”. In any representative system, the procedural aspect is particular-
ly important as individuals rarely get everything they want in terms of policy 
outputs. What counts then is the belief that institutions provide a fair articu-
lation of one’s interests. One reform that most people agree on in this context 
is that they would like to have the possibility to be directly included into the 
decision-making process via referenda. Given current challenges (making the 
Eurozone function properly, making the Schengen regime effective, etc.) several 
institutional reform options can be considered. Political scientist Simon Hix of 
the London School of Economics recently distinguished between minimalist and 
maximalist reform options. Minimalist reforms would require more scrutiny by 
national parliaments and oversight of the Euro Group by the European Parlia-
ment for example, while maximalist reforms could imply a series of referenda 
to ratify a new institutional architecture and the direct election of an EU Presi-
dent (Hix 2014). The findings presented here suggest that a maximalist reform 
option that involves referenda as a means to ratify a new institutional structure 
would most likely increase support, yet a direct election of an EU President might 
have the opposite effect. Hence, we could consider a middle option: the current 
institutional architecture could be reformed by giving national parliaments and 
the European Parliament more influence in many more aspects of fiscal and 
monetary cooperation, like approving austerity packages or any type of national 
reform that would be needed. In addition, we could more closely scrutinize the 
activities of the Council, Commission and Central Bank, all of which would need 
to be approved through a series of citizen referenda in all 28 member states, or at 
least within the Eurozone. When considering other steps in the integration pro-
cess, soliciting citizen preferences through referenda may prove a useful means 
to foster support. This might be a fruitful way to give citizens the feeling that 
they are in control when it comes to what happens in Brussels. 
A third and final conclusion is that the Eurozone crisis seems to have left a 
mark on public opinion. We find that contrary to findings in the past, citizens in 
Europe today, and especially those within the Eurozone, are more knowledgea-
ble about the EU. Yet, this increased knowledge may not necessarily have led to 
more approval. While support for the EU as such is high, policy support is not. 
Hence, a more attentive citizenry makes it even more important for the EU to 
perform, not only in terms of outcomes but also in terms of procedures, the way 
in which decisions and policies are made. The idea attributed to the Europe’s 
founding father Jean Monnet — that “Europe’s nations should be guided towards the 
super-state without their people understanding what is happening. This can be accom-
plished by successive steps, each disguised as having an economic purpose, but which will 
eventually and irreversibly lead to federation” — is no longer realistic, if it ever was 
(Podmore 2008: 235). The Eurozone crisis has also put the question of German 
leadership in the Union at the forefront of public debate, especially in the South. 
In the southern member states, Germany’s role in the Union is deeply divisive 
with a majority of the populations there disapproving of it. The question will be 
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how these perceptions will develop in the future. Given that the youngest gene-
ration (15- to 25-year-olds)  favours a strong German role, perhaps we can be 
optimistic that the divisions created in the Eurozone crisis between creditor and 
debtor nations will not be long-lasting. Yet, crucially, this will depend on how 
the EU is able to cater to the demands of citizens both in the bailout-battered 
South and the richer North. 
Fourth and finally, although the permissive consensus that characterized 
the Union until the 1990s is clearly over, some features of support remain today. 
The notion of the permissive consensus is the idea that elites decide where co-
operation is most beneficial to securing peace and prosperity — and that citizens 
largely follow them. The latter is no longer true today: European citizens active-
ly monitor the course of integration, and where necessary voice their fears and 
objections in referenda or European and national elections. Safeguarding peace 
and security, and promoting economic growth are the key policy goals that cit-
izens wish the EU to focus on. Given the threats on Europe’s borders, be it the 
conflict in Ukraine or in the Middle East, the first sentence of the Schuman dec-
laration drafted over six decades ago seems as appropriate as ever: “Peace cannot 
be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which 
threaten it.” Citizens in Europe, young and old, today and in the past, care deeply 
about securing peace and prosperity on the continent. 
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Data Collection Method: 
Programmatic Mobile Sampling 
The data for this study was collected by Dalia Research. Dalia Research has de-
veloped a proprietary technology platform that gives researchers access to a 
network of over 30.000 widely used apps and mobile websites, covering all ma-
jor content categories and guarantees broad access to all demographic groups, 
spread evenly across geographic regions. Through these apps and websites, res-
pondents are randomly invited to join a live-panel via a direct communication on 
the (mobile) website or app. To avoid self-selection bias based on research topics, 
survey invitations are presented in a generic format without information on the 
specific content of a research project. 
A potential respondent who receives an invitation and agrees to participate 
in a research study goes through a set of quick steps to assess basic demographic, 
targeting and behavioural attributes. These data are then used to create an anon-
ymous user-profile and to “register” the respondent (or rather, the respondent’s 
device) as a survey participant. During this process, the respondent is informed 
about the nature of the opinion research and explained that all information that 
the respondent provides will be recorded anonymously. 
To ensure a high degree of data quality, a set of dynamic proprietary algo-
rithms assess the trustability of a respondent by, for example, tracking user be-
haviour and profiles across metrics like completion times, answer consistency, 
response patterns and other metrics, including passive data observations, that 
correlate with data quality.
The surveys themselves are delivered through a fully responsive mobile 
web-interface with a low loading latency that provides consistent user-experi-
ence even in countries with slow internet connection. 
In this EUpinion survey, the number of total respondents in the EU is 12002.
As a certified corporate member of the World Association for Market, Social 
and Opinion Research (ESOMAR), Dalia Research complies with the ICC/ESOMAR 
International Code on Market and Social Research and strictly adheres to ISO 
Standards on market and opinion research, ESOMAR guidelines and the require-
ments of the Children’s Online Privacy Act (COPPA). To guarantee a high degree 
of data-integrity and data-quality, Dalia Research does not store any Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII) on respondents.
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figure 11 support for memebership lowest in Great  
 Britain and italy 
figure 12a divided support for the euro in eU28 
figure 12B support for euro in eurozone countries,  
 opposition in non-eurozone countries 
figure 13 opposition to euro Greatest in north  
 non-eurozone 
figure 14 support for euto Gratest in spain, opposition to  
 euro Greatest in Great Britain  
 
Support for Further Political and Economic  
Integration in Europe
figure 15 Within the eU28 People Prefer more Political  
 and economic integration 
figure 16 support for more Political and economic  
 integration slightly Greater in eurozone
figure 17 support for more Political and economic  
 integration Greatest in italy and spain,  
 Weakest in Great Britain
figure 18 support for more Political and economic  
 integration, Greatest in italy and spain,  
 Weakest in Great Britain
The Biggest Policy Achievements and Policy Needs  
in Europe
figure 19a opening Borders and intra-eU trade are seen as  
 europe’s Biggest achievements in eU28 
figure 19B security and Growth are seen as europe’s most  
 Pressing Policy needs in eU28
figure 20a opening Borders europe’s Biggest achievments  
 in non-eurozone, While trade in eurozone
figure 20B not many differences in eU’s Pressing Policy   
 Priorities in eurozone versus non-eurozone   
 members
figure 21a eU’s Biggest achievements 
figure 21B eU’s most Pressing Policy Priorities 
Views about the Direction the EU and the Country  
are Moving
figure 22 Witthin the eU28 People View that Both the  
 eU and their country are moving in the  
 Wrong direction  
figure 23 People more sceptical about eU and national  
 Policy direction in eurozone countries
figure 24 in the south People are the most sceptical about  
 Policy direcition in the eU and theit own country
figure 25 in the south People are most sceptical about   
 Policy direction in the eU and their own country
How to Talk To Friends about the Union
figure 26  People equally likely to talk Positively as  
 negatively about the eU to friends 
figure 27 no Big differrences Between euozine and    
 non-eurozone countries 
figure 28 People are more Positive about the eU in  
 north eurozone and east 
figure 29 Britons, french and italians least Positive  
 about the eU 
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German Leadership in the Union
figure 30 in the eU28 a majority Views Germany’s  
 leadership in the Union as Good 
figure 31 approval of Germany’s leadership in the Union  
 is higher in non-eurozone 
figure 32 approval of Germany’s leadership in the Union  
 is low in the south 
table 3 oldest and Youngest Generation in the south   
 most Positive about German leadership in  
 the Union
figure 33 approval of Germany’s leadership in the Union  
 is lowest in italy and spain
Part II: What Kind of Europe Do Europeans Want? 
A Note on Understanding the Conjoint Results 
table 4 example of a choice in the conjoint  
 experiment 
table 5 attributes of different dimensions 
 
Support for EU Reform Proposals 
figure 34 support for eU reform in 28 member states 
figure 35a support for eU reform in north eurozone 
figure 35B support for eU reform in north non-eurozone
figure 35c support for eU reform in south
figure 35d support for eU reform in east
figure 36a support for eU reform in Germany
figure 36B support for eU reform in france
figure 36c support for eU reform in Great Britain
figure 36d support for eU reform in italy
figure 36e support for eU reform in spain
figure 36f support for eU reform in Poland
 
Differences in Support for Reforms Proposals  
Across Generations
figure 37a different Views on reform of decision-making  
 across Generations
figure 37B different Views on reform of Policy Goals across  
 Generations
figure 38a different Views on reform of Policy Goals across  
 Generations in the north eurozone
figure 38B different Views on reform of Policy Goals across  
 Generations in the north non-eurozone
figure 38c different Views on reform of Policy Goals across  
 Generations in the south 
figure 38d different Views on reform of Policy Goals across  
 Generations in east
figure 39a different Views on reform of decision-making  
 across Generations in Great Britain
figure 39B different Views on reform of decision-making  
 across Generations in Germany
figure 39c different Views on reform of decision-making  
 across Generations in france
figure 39d different Views on reform of decision-making  
 across Generations in spain
figure 39e different Views on reform of decision-making  
 across Generations in italy
figure 39d different Views on reform of decision-making  
 across Generations in Poland
 
Differences in Support for Reform Proposals Across  
Men and Women
figure 40 different Views on eU reform Between men  
 and Women
 
Differences in Support for Reform Proposals Across  
Eurosceptics and Euro-supporters
figure 41 different Views on eU reform Based on   
 Knowledge about the eU
figure 42a different Views on eU reform Based on  
 membership support
figure 42B different Views on eU reform Based on  
 euro support
figure 43a different Views on eU reform Based on  
 membership support in the north eurozone
figure 43B different Views on eU reform Based on  
 membership support in the north non-eurozone
figure 43c different Views on eU reform Based on  
 membership support in the south
figure 43d different Views on eU reform Based on  
 membership support in the east
figure 44 different Views on eU reform Based  
 integration Preferences
figure 45a different Views on eU decision-making and   
 Policy Goals in the north eurozone
figure 45B different Views on eU decision-making and   
 Policy Goals in the north non-eurozone
figure 45c different Views on eU decision-making and   
 Policy Goals in the south
figure 45d different Views on eU decision-making and   
 Policy Goals in the east
figure 46 different Views on eU reform Based evaluation  
 of eU Policy direction
figure 47  different Views on eU reform Based evaluation  
 of national Policy direction
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